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The widespread disillusionment resulting from the excesses of the
railroad bond era of the nineteenth century caused a constitutional
revolution among the states. New limitations on the financial powers
of the states and their political subdivisions were adopted, including
express restrictions on government economic aid to private enterprises.
At the same time, the judiciary evolved a public purpose doctrine to
complement the new constitutional provisions.
Since the adoption of the Mississippi Balance Agriculture With
Industry plan (BAWl) in 1936, and especially since the end of World
War II, a number of local and national economic problems have
generated a twentieth-century counter-revolution. At first gradually,
but now with increasing momentum, a considerable minority of jurisdictions have adopted statewide programs which authorize the investment of state and municipal funds 1 in factories and equipment as a
means of inducing industrial development.' Several of these programs
present no problem of state constitutional law as they are based on
t Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University, South Jersey Division.

A.B.

1943, LL.B. 1950, University of Pennsylvania.

l Unless the context indicates otherwise, the terms "municipal" and "municipality" will be used to refer to all political subdivisions of the state.
2 Public industrial financing is only one technique which has been utilized to
encourage industrial development. Most states allocate considerable sums to advertising and personal solicitation. Technical staffs are made available to supply a
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newly adopted amendments. The majority, however, resting solely
on statute, do present constitutional difficulties which are the focus of
this study."
The Article divides itself into four major parts. First, the principal programs of public industrial financing currently in effect and
the judicial reaction to them will be outlined. Second, the historical
emergence of the constitutional limitations which are the subject of
this study and the judicial application of them during the nineteenth
century and the early decades of the twentieth century will be reviewed.
Third, the application of these constitutional restrictions to modern
industrial financing will be analyzed. Finally, the question of state
tax exemption incident to public industrial financing will be discussed.
I.

EcoNOMi

c

NEED AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE:

THE

CURRENT

PUBLIC INDUSTRIAL FINANCING PROGRAMS

A. The Mississippi Plan: Municipally Owned Plants Financed by
General Obligation Bonds
The modern phase 4 of state industrial financing began in 1936

with the enactment by the Mississippi legislature of the BAWI plan.5
great variety of detailed information to prospective industry. See GiLmoRF, DEVEIn addition, many southern states
OPING THE "LnILE" ECONOMIES 27-48 (1959).
offer tax exemptions to new industry for specified periods of time. See Note, 59
CoLutm. L. REv. 618, 626 n.66 (1959), where the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions granting tax exemptions are set forth.
3 See generally Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial
Location, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 618 (1959); Note, State Constitutional Limitations
on a Municipality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals
and Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 95 (1959); Note, The "Public Purpose" of
MunicipalFinancingfor IndustrialDevelopment, 70 YALE L.J. 789 (1961).
4 State governments have been encouraging new industry by offering subsidies
and tax exemptions since colonial times. In 1662, Virginia granted a bounty of
five pounds of tobacco for every yard of woolen cloth made in the colony. During
the eighteenth century, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
offered bounties to encourage the production of several products. Public loans and
land grants were likewise common. See HAwK, ECONOmiC HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
104-07 (1934); WRIGHT, EcoNomic HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 87-88 (2d ed.
1949).
5The 1936 enactment, by its own terms, lapsed in 1940. The present legislation, enacted in 1944, is substantially the same. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-05 to
8938-08 (1956).
The BAWI program was not the first twentieth-century industrial financing
program. It was preceded by at least one other, the Kansas industrial levy. Enacted in 1923, the Kansas statute originally authorized certain cities, and later
by amendment all cities, to levy a tax "for the purpose of creating a fund to be
used in securing industries or manufacturing institutions for such city . .. ."
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-1441 (Supp. 1959). While some of the proceeds of
the tax have been used for the purchase of land and buildings for lease to private
industry, there has been uncertainty in the state as to whether the statute authorizes outright indistrial financing of this kind, or is limited to expenditures designed
to aid and encourage industrial expansion, such as advertising and installation of
water mains and sewers. As a result of this uncertainty as well .as other factors,
such as the fluctuating attitudes of the voters in approving the levy, this program
has not played an important role in Kansas. See HITE, THE INDUSTRIAL LV= IN
KANSAS 1-18 (Kansas Univ. Bureau of Business Research 1954).
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Mississippi was faced with a short-run and a long-run problem.' The
impact of the depression was severe. Both unemployment and underemployment were acute. Per capita income was at the desperate figure
of 41% of the national average.7 Further, to use the language of the
economist W. W. Rostow, the state's basically agricultural economy
was on the verge of its "take-off"-its first period of rapid, sustained,
industrial growth.8
The legislature responded to these problems with a program of
municipal industrial financing. The BAWI statute authorizes any
municipality, upon approval of a project by its electorate and a state
agency, to issue, within statutory limits, general obligation bonds to
finance the construction of a plant, together with the necessary machinery and equipment, for long-term lease to a private industry9 The
state agency is directed to issue a certificate of public convenience and
necessity if it finds that there are sufficient natural resources and labor
to support the proposed industry, and that the project will promote
the economic objectives set forth in the statute.'0
At the outset, nominal rentals made BAWI an outright subsidy
program." However, over the years, the philosophy of the administrators has moved away from that policy. Today, the objective is to
fix rentals so that they will amortize the bonded indebtedness and pay
the interest charges within the primary term of the lease.' Net leases
are used whereby the lessee maintains the premises at his own expense
and pays all insurance premiums. The primary term of the lease may
be as high as twenty-five years with options to extend for seven-year
periods at nominal rentals. A maximum term is fixed at ninety-nine
years.' 3 The lessee thus has an assured occupancy for the entire useful
life of the facility. Elements of subsidy still remain, however, as
rentals fail to reflect any charge for risk of loss or costs of administration, and tax exemptions are still provided.
6

HopKrNs, Mississippfs BANVI PLAN 4-9, 17-18 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, 1944); WALLAcE, INDUSTRIALIZING Mississippi 2-3, 13-17 (Univ. of Miss.
Bureau of Public Administration 1952).
7 Survey of Current Business at 15, Aug. 1949.
8Rosrow, THE STAGES OF ECONo0IC GROWTH 4-9, 17-18 (1960).
9 MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-08 to -09, -11, -13 (1956).
10 Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-08 (1956).
11 HOPKINS, op. cit. mipra note 6, at 3-6, 9, 29; WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 7-9, 27, 30.
12 Miss. AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL BD., Mississippfs BAWl PLAN 3 (un-

dated) ; Letter From W. P. Starnes, Ass't Director, Miss. Agricultural & Industrial Bd., to David E. Pinsky, Dec. 16, 1960.
13 MISS. AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL BD., MississIrPI's BAWl PLAN 3 (undated) ; Letter From Lester G. Franklin, Ass't Attorney General, State of Mississippi,

to David E.Pinsky, Aug. 15, 1959.
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Except for a four-year hiatus during World War II, the BAWI
plan has been continuously in effect since 1936. Substantially similar
programs are now in operation in at least six other jurisdictions,14 five
of which are southern or border states. As the Appendix indicates,
total activity under the Mississippi plan, however, far exceeds that in
any other state.
The Mississippi plan is attractive to industry because of the savings it passes on to the lessee. As public property, the land and plant
are exempt from all state and local real property taxes.:5 In addition,
municipal bonds are marketed at lower interest rates than private
corporate bonds so that the lessee has less to amortize in rent. This
interest saving springs from several factors. Because public financing
pledges future taxes, government obligations are more attractive to
investors even at lower interest rates than those of many small private
enterprises whose ability to repay is uncertain. Moreover, income
from municipal bonds is exempt from federal income taxes 16 while the
bonds themselves are exempt from state personal property taxes 17 so
that a lower interest rate does not really reduce net income. Further,
in several states, municipal bonds are authorized as investments for
banks, fiduciaries, and others who are traditionally regulated. 8 This
facilitates their sale, without having to compete with other bonds by
offering high returns.
B. The Revenue Bond Plan: Municipally Owned Plants
Financed by Revenue Bonds
Beginning in 1946, a number of state legislatures enacted statutes
authorizing municipalities to finance the construction and equipping
of industrial plants by the issuance of revenue bonds. Although these
plans are modeled on the BAWI program, they differ from it in that
the bonds are payable only from the income produced by the facility
rather than from general taxes. Though revenue bonds do not, therefore, rest entirely upon the credit of the municipality, the plans which
utilize them offer to industry many of the features which make the
14 Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956) (construing a general
borrowing enabling statute); ALA. CONST. amends. 84, 94, 95, 104, 128; LA. CONsT.
art. 14, § 14(b.2) ; Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 23(a) ; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 71.790-.850 (Supp.
1961) ; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-57-02 to -20 (Supp. 1961); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-2901 to -2916 (Supp. 1962). The programs in Kentucky, North Dakota and
Tennessee do not rest on any enabling constitutional amendment.
15 See notes 224-25 infra and accompanying text.
16 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
17 E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 8936-17 (1956) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2913 (Supp.

1962).
18LA. REv. STAT. § 9:2061(4) (1951); MISS. CODE ANN. § 421 (1956); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-2914 (Supp. 1962).
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Mississippi plan attractive. 9 Other closely related statutes permit the
organization of local public corporations or authorities which have the
power to construct industrial plants for long-term lease or sale to
private industry.
At least fifteen states have one of these two related types of legislation.2" A few of these are northern jurisdictions, but the only
substantial implementation of these programs has been in Alabama,
Kentucky, and Tennessee,2 all states with per capita incomes of no
more than 70%o of the national average and still in the midst of their
industrial take-offs."2
C. The Pennsylvania Plan: Second Mortgage Loans Financed by
Current Taxation
The economic background of the Pennsylvania industrial financing program was very different from that of the BAWI and other
southern plans. The economy of Pennsylvania reached maturity by
World War I; by the end of World War II it was clearly in the
post-maturity period. Certain sectors of the state's economy entered
a period of severe decline, causing persistently high unemployment in
many counties. 3 To meet these problems, the Pennsylvania legis19 The land and the facility are generally exempt from property taxes. See
notes 224-25 infra and accompanying text. While the public credit is not pledged,
the interest rate on the bonds is for several reasons lower than many small enterprises could obtain. As in the case of general obligation bonds, the interest on
revenue bonds is exempt from federal income taxes. Rev. Rul. 187, 1957-1 Cum.
BuLL. 65; Rev. Rul. 106, 1954 Cum. BuLL. 28; cf. Bryant v. Commissioner, 111
F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1940). This advantage has been condemned by many observers;
see notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text. See generally Armstrong, "Municipal
Inducements"-The New Mexico Commercial and Industrial Project Revenue Bond
Act, 48 CAuy. L. RFv. 58 (1960). In addition, many states make revenue bonds
authorized investments for savings banks and insurance companies. E.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 37, §511(29) (1958). Finally, the formal status of the bonds as governmental
obligations may well make them more attractive to investors for other than economic reasons. Many investors, for example, are motivated by feelings of civic
obligation. Letter From Ed. E. Reid, Executive Director, Alabama League of Muncipalities, to David E. Pinsky, June 21, 1960.
2
OLegislation authorizing municipalities to issue revenue bonds: ALA. CODE
tit. 37, § 511(20)-(32) (1958) ; ARx. STAT. ANm. §§ 13-1601 to -1614 (Supp. 1961)to;
GA. CODE ANN. § 87-802(a) (11) (Supp. 1961) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 8-4-1
-22 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Ky. Rrv. STAT. §§ 103.200-.280 (1959); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 8936-51 to -69 (Supp. 1960); Mo. CoNsT. art. 6, § 27; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 71.790N.D. CENT.
.850 (Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANY. §§ 14-41-31 to -43 (Supp. 1961);
;
CODE ANN. §§ 40-57-02 to -18 (1961) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, ch. 2(d), §§ 2-16 (1961)
§§2701-14
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1701 to -1716 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
(1959); Kan. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 81, §§ 1-11; Neb. Laws 1961, ch. 54, No. 159,
at 200.
Legislation authorizing the organization of public corporations or authorities:
ALA.CODE tit. 37, § 815-30 (1958) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306(A) (Supp. 1961);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2801 to -2820 (Supp. 1962).
21
See Appendix, pp. 326-27 infra.
22 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTIcAL ABSTRA T OF THE UNITED STATES 310
(1961).
23 The depletion of the state's forest resources led to the decline of the lumbering industry. The anthracite coal industry was severely affected by the pronounced
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lature in 1956 enacted a new kind of industrial development program,
under which the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority was
created.24 The Authority is authorized to make second mortgage loans
from appropriations out of current revenues for industrial plant construction in areas of the state which have a substantial labor surplus
as defined in the act.2 5 The loans, however, are not made directly to
industry, but to local non-profit industrial development corporations
which in turn lease the factories to private enterprises. Under the
typical financing pattern, the local non-profit development corporation
constructs a plant for long-term lease to private industry. A first
mortgage for 50% is obtained from a private lender; the Authority
lends 30% on a second mortgage security for a term up to 25 years; 26
and the local non-profit development corporation invests the remaining
20%, often raising it by the sale of securities to local citizens.
In 1958, Kentucky adopted legislation substantially similar to the
Pennsylvania program," and variants have been enacted in two other
jurisdictions."
D. The New England Plai: State Insuranwe of First Mortgages
Like the economy of Pennsylvania, that of New England had
developed weak sectors by the end of World War II.2 In an attempt
shift in demand from coal to oil and gas for heating purposes. Railroad maintenance
was for many years a major industry in many parts of Pennsylvania, but the
dieselization of the railroads and the growth of competitive trucking industry have
sharply reduced employment in many Pennsylvania communities formerly dependent
on the railroad maintenance shops. In addition, there has been a southward exodus
of the textile industry. See Davlin, State Development Corporations: The Pennsylvania Experience, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89 (1959); Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 51-55 (1959) ; Fernstrom, A Community Attack on Chronic Unemployment,
in Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems, Studies in Unemployment,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (Comm. Print 1960); P.LD.A.-A Look at State-Wide
Ventures in Industrial Development, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PiilA. BUS. REV. 3, 4
(July 1958).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 301-14 (1960).
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 303 (d) (1960).
26 The statute does not fix either the maximum terms of the Authority's mortgage or the interest rate. The maximum term has been fixed by the Authority
itself at 25 years. PA. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 100% FINANCING FOR YOUR PLANT 1
(undated). Typical loans, however, are from 12 to 18 years. P.I.D.A.-A Look
At State-Wide Ventures in Industrial Development, op. cit. supra note 23, at 7. The
Authority has fixed the minimum interest rate at 2%, but actual interest rates have
ranged from 2% to 5%, with an average rate of 2'/%. GmMoRE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 53; PENNSYLVANIA INDUsTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, A QUEsTioN
Atw 2 ANSWER SUMMARY 8 (undated).
l7KY. REv. STAT. §§ 154.001-.170 (Supp. 1961).
28ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-523, -532 (Supp. 1961). See note 5 supra for a discussion of the Kansas statute. See also the following two Arkansas Statutes which
have recently been repealed: Ark. Acts 1957, No. 567, § 19 at 1475; Ark. Acts 1955,
No. 404, § 34, at 1088.
29 Technological changes, decline in certain industries, obsolete multistory buildings, and loss of certain industries such as textiles to the South are some of the
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to remedy the situation, agencies have recently been created in Maine,"0
Rhode Island,81 and Vermont 8 with the power to insure long-term
first mortgage loans by pledging the credit of the state. These loans,
made by private investors for industrial plant construction, may be
insured in amounts as high as 90% of the project cost. The mortgagor must be a non-profit development corporation which intends to
sell or lease the property to a private manufacturer.
The Pennsylvania and New England plans, despite obvious differences between them, have similar underlying economic and social
approaches which differ markedly from those of the Mississippi plan.
While BAWl provides 100% public financing, the northern plans
seek to encourage the maximum possible financing from conventional
private investment sources. In addition, unlike the Mississippi plan,
the northern programs are initiated by local government groups, which
serve as a potential check on government error. Moreover, the
northern plans are based on a statewide tax or credit base in which
many risks are pooled under one system, while BAWl is supported by
a narrow municipal tax base in which even one loss can have a substantial effect on a municipality's total financial position. Lastly,
while the Mississippi plan rests in part on state and federal tax
exemptions, these play only a minor role in the northern programs."
E. The Oklahoma Plan: State or Municipal General Obligation Bonds
to Finance Mortgage Loans to Local Non-Profit
Development Corporations
Legislative trends in the last five years reflect the impact of the
Pennsylvania and New England formulas. Pursuant to constitutional
responsible factors.

Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee

on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-165 (1959). The first response
of New England legislatures to these economic problems was the creation of statewide development credit corporations chartered by special acts. Their purpose is
to provide risk capital for promising industrial firms that cannot qualify for medium
or long-term loans from commercial banks. See generally GImmoIE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 140-51; Shils, State Development Credit Corporations and Authorities
and Problems of Financing Small Business, and Anderson, State Development Credit
Corporations,in SENATE Comm. ON BANKING & CuRRExNcY, DEVEOPMENT CORPORATIONS AND AUTHORiTIES, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 28 (Comm. Print 1959).
80
ME. CONST. art. IX, § 14-A; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38-B, §§ 1-14 (Supp.

1961).
31 I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-34-1 to -18 (Supp. 1961).

Article 4, section 13

of the state constitution provides that the credit of the state shall not be pledged for
the payment of the obligation of others without the consent of the people. Article 4,
section 14 provides that two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the
legislature must assent to any bill appropriating public money for local or private
purposes. Both provisions were complied with.
32 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 201-215 (Supp. 1961).
the non-profit development corporation raises its equity investment by the
33If
issuance of bonds, the interest on these obligations may be exempt from federal
income taxes. Treasury Dep't, Treasury Ruling: I-FCD-5 (1959). This does not
however, create a significant element of subsidy.
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amendment, the Oklahoma legislature in 1959 adopted legislation
creating a state authority with the power to make second mortgage
loans to local development corporations financing industrial development projects.3 4 The authority obtains its funds by issuing general
obligation bonds. Variants of the Oklahoma plan have been adopted
37
6
in New York,35 Maryland," and New Hampshire.
New Hampshire diagnosed its needs differently than did other
states. While not regarding the state as distressed, the legislature was
concerned that the state's factories, largely of the multistory mill type,
were fast becoming obsolete, and that the state would stagnate economically unless a sufficient number of modern plants were built to replace
them. 38 The land potentially available for industrial development was
largely unready in that it lacked water and sewerage connections and
access roads. New Hampshire attempted to meet this problem by
making available short-term construction loans for the preparation of
sites as industrial parks and for the construction of plants. 9 Local
development corporations are responsible for securing permanent
financing from other sources.
F. The Curtailment of Sources of Long-Term Capital
The impact of the various economic developments that have stimulated legislation making available public funds for industrial development has been greatly intensified by certain profound institutional
changes throughout the economy which have curtailed the availability
of long-term capital for small business,4" particularly manufacturing
S4 OiA. CoNsT. art X, § 34; OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 28, §§ 851-68 (Supp.
1962).
5 N.Y. CoNsT. art VII, § 8, art X, § 7; N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW §§ 1800-49.
36 MD. ANN. CODE art. 45A, §§ 1-3 (Supp. 1962) (mortgage loans by municipalities). Compare Md. Laws 1953, ch. 662, at 1462. Similar legislation was
adopted in Arkansas pursuant to constitutional amendment, but it was recently repealed. Ark. Acts 1959, No. 121, §§ 1-10, at 341.
37 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-A :1 to -A:16 (Supp. 1961).

38 See GILMORE, op. cit. stpra note 2, at 50-51; letter from Winfred L. Foss,

Secretary, N.H. Industrial Park Authority, to David E. Pinsky, July 13, 1960.
89 See ibid.; N.H. INDUSTRIAL PARK AUTH., BIENNIAL REP. TO THE 1959 GENERAL COURT.
40 See Comm. OF NEW ENGLAND OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N, THE EcoNOMIC STATE OF NEW ENGLAND, NEW ENGLAND'S FINA NCIAL RESOURCES AND THEIR
USE 1-21 (1953) [hereinafter cited as NEW ENGLAND]; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REP. TO THE Comm. ON BANKING & CURRENCY AND
THE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-149 (Comm.
Print 1958) [hereinafter cited as BOARD OF GOVERNORS]; Hearings Before a Sub-

committee of the"Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, Financing Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-55 (1958); REPORT TO THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND MIGRATION SUBCOMM. OF THE TENN. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MIGRATION AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN TENNESSEE 204-41 (1958) [hereinafter cited as TENINESSEE]; SMITH, EQUITY AND LOAN CAPITAL FOR NEW AND EXPANDING BUSINESS

(W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) ; Cahn, Capital for Small BusiLAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27 (1959).

ness: Sources and Methods, 24
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units.4 A considerable alteration has occurred in the channels through
which capital flows into productive investment. Increasing proportions of savings are going into institutional forms-life insurance,
savings and loan associations, government bonds, pension funds, and
trusts. Both legal and economic factors limit the power of these financial intermediaries to invest in long-term obligations or in equities.
State laws generally fix the maximum amount of loans that can be
made by state incorporated commercial banks in such a manner as to
restrict the ability of many of them to make long-term loans for plant
construction. In Tennessee, for example, only 29 of the 216 state
incorporated banks can make loans of over $75,000.2 Moreover, commercial banks must keep their loans quite liquid and are therefore
43
limited to short or at most intermediate terms.

Loans by life insurance companies to small business are likewise
restricted by state regulatory legislation and by the general inability
of small borrowers to meet credit standards as to earnings, stability,
and management.44 Insurance companies do not believe that the higher
interest rate charged small borrowers adequately compensates the
lender for these added risks. Similarly, law and custom combine to
limit trust institutions and individual fiduciaries to "blue chip" investments. 4' Finally, high rates of personal and corporate income taxes
and continued inflation also contribute to the gap in allocating savings
to small business.46
The need for more long-term capital, particularly for small manufacturing units, is directly reflected in the state industrial development
programs. They are generally intended to make public funds and
credit available to manufacturing rather than other industrial enterprises. Several statutes explicitly impose this limitation,4 7 while others,
containing no such express restriction, 48 have been administered as if
so limited. 9 Moreover, while none of the statutes expressly limit the
size of projects to be financed, smaller business units have been the
major beneficiaries."
41

42

BoARD OF GOVERNORS at

13.

TENNESSEE at 225-26.
43 See SmITH, op. cit. supra note 40, at 33.
44 See NEw ENGLAND at 18-19; TENNESSEE at 44, SMITH, op. cit. mipra note 40,
at 42-43; BOARD OF GOVERNORS at 32-35, 512-24.
48 NEw ENGLAND at 19.
46 Id.at 13.
47
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38-B, §5 (III) (Supp. 1961); IRy. REV. STAT.
§ 103.200 (1959) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1702, 6-2902 (Supp. 1962).
48 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 303(i) (1960).
49 See PENNSYLVANIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REP. No. 10, SUmMARY OF LOAN ACTMTS, JULY 31, 1956-JUNE 21, 1960; cf. In re Opinion to the
Governor, 155 A.2d 602 (R.I. 1959).
50 See GImoRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58-59. During the period July 31, 1956
to March 30, 1959, 60% of the projects approved by the Pennsylvania Industrial
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G. The Policy Controversy
As might be expected in a private enterprise society, public industrial financing has met strong opposition. The Investment Bankers
Association has recommended that its members "exercise extreme caution in underwriting or marketing [industrial financing] bonds." "'
Others have joined in the opposition. 2 The federal income tax exemption of income from municipal obligations, particularly revenue bonds,
has been under persistent attack.5 3 Commentators allege that public

financing has been overemphasized at the expense of other factors far
more crucial to industrial site selection.5" There is also a genuine concern that the use of public credit to finance private industrial expansion
will hamper the ability of state and local governments to improve other
community services." Furthermore, to the extent that public industrial financing becomes a weapon in the interstate struggle to attract
new industry, the public participants may find that their losses from
tax exemption and hampered borrowing power exceed their gains.
While it is not the objective of this study to focus on these vital
questions of policy except to the extent that they are pertinent to constitutional issues, a brief digression may not be inappropriate. Regrettably, there has been a paucity of effort by economists to critically evaluate public industrial financing. The dearth of economic studies limits
the lawyer's resources for intelligent judgment. The curtailment of
sources of long-term capital, particularly those available to small manufacturers, and the failure of the federal government to adequately correct the situation, may justify some commitment of public funds or
Development Authority involved project costs of $300,000 or less.

See PENNSYL-

VANIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REP. No. 4, SUMMARY OF LOAN AcTIVITiES,
51

JULY 31, 1956-MAXcH 30, 1959.

INVESTMENT BANKERS Ass'N OF AMERICA, MUNICIPAL INDUSTRIAL FINANCING

24 (1961).
52
Resolution of the American Bar Ass'n, Section on Municipal Law (1952);
Resolution of the Municipal Finance Officers' Ass'n (1953); Panel Discussions Before House Ways and Means Committee, Income Tax Revision, 86th Cong., 2d S6ss.
339-46 (1959); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954); H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1954).
53Ibid. Bills have been introduced to remove the exemption for industrial
financing revenue bonds, see, e.g., H.R. 798, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); and to
deny any deduction for rental paid by an industrial lessee to any state or local government, see, H.R. 6368, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
54 See FYFE, MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCATION OF INDUSTRY (1961) ; SOHN &
BARNES,

SURVEY OF EXECUTIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW

ENGLAND 52-58, 72-86, 90-92 (1955); UNIv. OF ALABAMA BUREAU OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND ]NDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
See
SOUTHEAST (1952); Cf. WALLACE, INDUSTRIALIZING MississiPPI 51-52 (1952).
generally GzEENHUT, PLANT LOCATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1956).
r5 UNIV. OF ALABAMA BUREAU OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 54;

Paty, Local Government: Its Quality and Performance, 2 J. PUB. L. 85 (1953).
See generally Report of the Comm. On Industrial Development to the Southern
Governors' Conference, Sept. 24-27, 1961.
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credit by states with serious economic problems. However, since state
programs are initiated and implemented in a context of interstate
competition to attract new industries, it is difficult for any state to
objectively draw a line between adequate and excessive allocation of
public funds and credit for industrial financing. Only federal intervention can effectively provide the necessary restraint.
One suggestion for such intervention is that Congress deprive the
states, municipalities, and their lessees of the federal tax advantages
they presently enjoy. Such a step, however, might be looked upon as
a punitive measure directed primarily at the South. In addition, any
attempt to modify the tax-exempt status of industrial financing bonds
would be opposed by many nonsouthern state and local government
officials who would view it as an entering wedge for the complete
elimination of the tax-exempt status of all municipal obligations.
Federal action linked to the Federal Area Redevelopment Act
would be more acceptable." Presently this statute prohibits federal
financial assistance to aid industries in relocating." Future amendments could, particularly if the amount of federal aid is expanded, require certain minimum fair standards for competition by states for new
industry as a condition of eligibility for federal benefits. The creation
of such standards would no doubt require careful consideration by the
appropriate committees of Congress. However, until Congress takes
such action, the danger that the states and municipalities will overcommit their limited resources in industrial financing will persist.
II. ECONOmic

NEED AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE

The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the BAWI statute in
1938 in the landmark case of Albritton v. City of Winona."8 Attacks
based on the state constitutional prohibition against lending public
credit to private enterprise and on the public purpose doctrine were rejected. The court analogized to the generally approved practice of
governmental construction and leasing of transportation facilities. The
Albritton decision marked a new phase in state constitutional law.
Relying heavily on the critical nature of the economic problems sought
to be remedied, courts in southern and border states followed Albritton. 9 Particularly noteworthy is the Maryland case of City of Frost56 75 Stat. 47 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2501-25 (Supp. 1961).
57 75 Stat. 50 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2505(a) (Supp. 1961).
58 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dinissed,303 U.S. 627 (1938).
59 Andres v. First Arkansas Dev. Fin. Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97
(1959); Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Industrial Dev. Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 291
S.W.2d 802 (1956) (statute authorizing state to invest a portion of treasury surplus
in bonds of local non-profit development corporations sustained in both Arkansas
cases) ; Industrial Dev. Authority v. Eastern Ky. Regional Planning Comm'n, 332
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burg v. Jenkins," in which tax supported industrial financing was upheld by analogy to the long standing public practice of financing port
facilities for use by water carriers. Related decisions permit port
districts to exercise the power of eminent domain for port related
industrial uses. 61 At the same time, however, a roughly equal number
of courts-principally in northern jurisdictions-sharply rejected
Albritton.6 2 The judges ruled, either expressly or impliedly, that the
urgency of need for public financing had no constitutional relevance.
Courts have also split on the validity of the revenue bond plans,
with the weight of authority in favor of their validity.'
The basic difference in approach between the southern and northern courts lies in the consideration to.be given to economic factors in
constitutional decision. The difference, however, may be more apparent than real. Of the eight states in which industrial financing plans
were sustained, six had a per capita income level of less than 80% of
the average rate for the continental United States, and five had per
capita income levels of 70% or less. On the other hand, all five states
in which industrial financing legislation was invalidated had per capita
income levels of 80% of the average national rate or better." The
contrast in the rates of unemployment of these states is also significant.
Five of the eight jurisdictions which sustained industrial financing had,
for virtually the entire twenty-four month period prior to the court
S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1960) (Pennsylvania plan); Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d
648 (Ky. 1956) (Mississippi plan); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136
A.2d 852 (1957) (variant of Oklahoma plan); McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203
Tenn. 448, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958) (Mississippi plan).
60 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957).
61 Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Ore. 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958); Atwood v.
Willacy County Nay. Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.), affd, 153 Tex. 645
(1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1955).
62 McClelland v. Mayor of Wilmington, 159 A.2d 596 (Del. Ch. 1960) ; State v.
Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952) (alternative holding); Village of
Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960) ; State ex rel.
Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957); cf. Hogue v. Port of
Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). While these decisions, with the
exception of Hogue, all involve issues of revenue bonds, this in fact adds to their
force, for the constitutional argument against the validity of revenue bonds is weaker
than the case against general obligation bonds.
63 Plans upheld: Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629
(1952); Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960); Kansas ex tel.
Ferguson v. City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 (1961); Bennett v. City
of Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1959); Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468,
232 S.W.2d 80 (1950); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d
920 (1956); Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 202 Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d 373
(1957); Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951); cf.
Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1950); West v. Industrial
Dev. Bd., 206 Tenn. 154, 332 S.W.2d 201 (1960).
Plans held invalid: McClelland v. Mayor of Wilmington, 159 A.2d 596 (Del. Ch.
1960); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952) ; Village of Moyie
Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960); State ex tel. Beck
v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957)..
64 See Table I, p. 327 infra.
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ruling, rates of insured unemployment dramatically higher than the
national average. In four of the five states which invalidated such
legislation, the rate of insured unemployment prior to the decision was
significantly lower than the national average.65 The Washington court
was the only one to strike down industrial financing legislation in the
face of an unemployment rate markedly higher than the national
average; " and it is noteworthy that this is the only invalidating decision which was the product of a divided court. These statistics must,
of course, be viewed with caution. They do suggest, however, that
economic conditions have been a significant factor in many judicial
decisions. The figures indicate that favorable decisions may be expected
in states where the economic need for them is strong, and invalidating
decisions may be anticipated in states where economic need is less
urgent. The probability of accurate prediction in the latter states, however, is less certain.
III.

THE

EMERGENCE

OF

STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

PROHIBITING PUBLIC FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The state constitutional limitations which threaten to restrict current programs of public industrial financing cannot properly be analyzed
without reference to their historical background. The history of these
provisions has been related before and will be set forth here only summarily.67

It begins during that frenetic period in American history,

the railroad-aid bond era. During the 1830's and 1840's, the economies of the eastern states were preparing for and commencing their
"take-offs." The construction of adequate social overhead capital, particularly railroads and canals, was an essential precondition of that
development.6" As pressure mounted for longer railroads to penetrate
more sparsely settled areas, private capital was not readily forthcoming.
A demand for the use of public credit accordingly developed. During
the mid-nineteenth century, several state governments filled this financial vacuum by lending their credit or by borrowing in order to purchase railroad shares. The panic of 1837, however, forced a more
sober approach, resulting in the first adoption of state constitutional
65 Ibid.
66
Hogue v.

Port of

Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) ; see note 64

sup ra.
67 See generally ADAMS, PUBLIC DEBTS 301-06, 317-42 (1893); CLEVELAND &
PoWELL, PRoAD FINANCES 31-32 (1920); HLL-HOUSE, MUYNICIPAL BONDS 143-99
(1936); SECIST, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
UPON PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 13-44, 54-83 (1914); WRIGHT,
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 280-86 (1949).
68

See RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 24-26. 38 (1960).' Compare

text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
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limitations on incurring state debt. But the constitutional changes
adopted placed restrictions upon state debt only. It was generally assumed that the new limitations had no application to political subdivisions. 9 Legislatures freely authorized counties and municipalities
to incur debt to aid railroad construction, and these units did so eagerly.
The mood of euphoric optimism which prevailed was soon replaced,
however, by one of disillusionment. Many railroad lines were abandoned as unprofitable, thus dangerously impairing the credit of the
many municipalities which had financed them. The result was a second constitutional reaction, directed this time at restricting the financial
activities of political subdivisions as well as of the states.
Debt limitations, provisions requiring electorate approval of borrowing, prohibitions against the state's becoming a party to any work
of internal improvement, and prohibitions on financial aid to private
enterprise were the principal constitutional limitations which emerged.
The latter prohibitions are of particular interest in this study. Three
principal types predominate. First, and most common, is the clausereferred to herein as the credit clause-which provides that the credit
of the state and of its political subdivisions "shall not in any manner be
given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation." 7' A second type, almost as fashionable as the first, is a clause
-referred to herein as the stock clause-which prohibits the state and
71
political subdivisions from becoming stockholders in any corporation.
These two provisions were a direct response to two common methods
of providing public financial assistance to railroads. One method was
public guaranty of railroad bonds, which in some instances took the
form of an exchange of railroad bonds for governmental obligations,
the latter then being sold on the market by the private corporation.7 2
In reality, the railroad was the principal debtor and the more attractive
public credit was made available only to assist it in raising the neces69 Prettyman v. Supervisors of Tazewell County, 19 II. 406 (1858); City of
Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74 (1857) (internal improvement clause); Comm'rs of
Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 491-94 (1871) (internal improvement
clause); Davidson v. Comm'rs of Ramsey County, 18 Minn. 482, 494-95 (1872);
Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248, 258-59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); Cass v.
Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 614-15 (1853); Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 136,
Contra, People
170-75 (1859); Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Vis. 195, 221-28 (1860).
ex rel. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 503-05 (1871).
7
o E.g., PA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 6. This clause first appeared in the Rhode Island
Constitution of 1842 as a limitation on the state in the absence of electorate approval.
It next appeared in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 (art. 4, § 6, par. 3) and the
New York Constitution of 1846 (art. 7, § 9) as absolute limitations on the state.
71
E.g., PA. CONST. art. 9, § 6. This clause first appeared in the Iowa Constitution of 1846 (art. 8, § 2) as a limitation on the state.
72 See, e.g., Society for Say. v. City of New London, 20 Conn. 174 (1860);
Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); Rogan v.
City-of Watertown, 30 Wis. 259 (1872); see CLEVELAND & POWELL, Op. Cit. supra
note 67, at 31-32.
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sary capital. As a variant of this procedure, there were instances of the
donation of county and municipal bonds to railroad corporations.'s
The credit clause was designed to eliminate these forms of financial aid
to private enterprise. However, in the case of the political subdivisions,
the other method-stock subscriptions-was by far the most common
form of financial assistance.74 Typically railroad stock was exchanged
for public bonds, the latter, of course, being duly sold by the corporation on the market. Even though the public stock subscriptions were
almost universally financed by borrowing, the legislatures and courts
of the time drew a clear distinction between an exchange of bonds for
bonds, prohibited by the credit clause, and an exchange of public bonds
for railroad stock, which was viewed as a form of joint venture in the
business of railroading not prohibited by the credit clause. 75 This distinction made necessary the stock clause as an additional constitutional
safeguard against public financial assistance to the railroads.
The credit and stock clauses, however, did not erect any barrier
against loans or donations financed out of current taxation, or against
gifts of land.7 6 A number of states, therefore, adopted additional prohibitions barring this type of aid, even though it did not occur in significant proportions. This third type of clause, somewhat less common
than the credit and stock clauses, varies in wording from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Pennsylvania's is typical in commanding the legislature not to authorize any political subdivision "to obtain or appropriate
money for . . . any corporation, association . . . or individual." 77
73 See, e.g., Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Whiting v.
Sheboygan & F.R.R., 25 Wis. 167 (1870) (act held invalid).
74 See e.g., Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857, aff'd,
28 N.Y. 605 (1864); Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607 (1853); Nichol v. Nashville,
28 Tenn. 252 (1848). Municipal shareholdings were often substantial. At the close
of the year 1851, for example, political subdivisions in Pennsylvania had subscribed
to almost six million dollars of stock in the Pennsylvania Railroad as compared
with private subscriptions of under two and one-half million dollars. See BURGESS &
KENNEDY, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMTPANY 58
(1949).
75 See note 156 inzfra.
76 The language of the credit clause itself clearly does not embrace moneys paid
out of current revenues. However, the only nineteenth-century decision so holding
appears to be Merchants' Union Barb-Wire Co. v. Brown, 64 Iowa 275, 20 N.W. 434
(1884). Twentieth-century cases are all in accord. Industrial Dev. Authority v.
Eastern Ky. Regional Planning Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1960); Opinion of
the Justices, 337 Mass. 800, 152 N.E.2d 90 (1958); see Andres v. First Arkansas
Dev. Fin. Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97 (1959); Halbert v. Helena-West
Helena Industrial Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 291 S.W.2d 802 (1956). With respect to
clause, see note 156 infra.
the stock
7
The New York clause
7 PA. CONST. art. 9, § 7 (applicable to municipalities).
is clearer and broader in prohibiting the giving or lending of money or property.
See N.Y. COinST. art. 7, § 8, art. 8, § 1. More limited than both the Pennsylvania
and New York versions is the clause adopted in Kentucky which is applicable only
to the state and which is limited to donations. KY. CONST. § 177. The first clear
version of the current appropriations clause appears to be article 9, section 10, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873.
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This type of provision will hereafter be referred to as the "current appropriations" clause, and the three clauses will be generically termed
"public aid limitations."
At the turn of the century, some form of public aid limitation had
been incorporated in the constitutions of a large majority of the states.
For better or for worse, they are still with us, virtually unchanged.
Although the public aid limitations took certain common forms, the
pattern which has emerged throughout the country is not uniform.
The constitutional movement of the nineteenth century was an extremely pragmatic one; each change in each state was a direct reaction
to the specific evils which had manifested themselves in that and perhaps neighboring jurisdictions. Some constitutions therefore contain
only a credit clause, others join to it a stock clause, and still others
have all three. The potential for diversity is further intensified by the
fact that any or all of these restrictions may apply only to the state, to
counties, to cities and towns, or to a specified combination of these.7"
It is appropriate at this point to consider in somewhat greater
detail the specific evils to which the public aid limitations were addressed. The term "lending of credit," so popular in the nineteenth
century but now relatively obsolete, is significant. A basic element of
the railroad-aid schemes was the marketing of state and municipal
obligations, without direct governmental control, by the corporation
which was to receive the proceeds. The common pattern involved delivery to the railroad of governmental bonds payable to the corporation
or bearer, either as a donation or in exchange for shares; the corporation in turn disposed of the bonds as it saw fit.7" They were often sold
in eastern markets for as low as 65 to 70 cents on the dollar.8 '
In addition, there was practically no public control over the planning of the railroad project or over the actual expenditures of publicly
contributed funds. These functions were completely delegated to private corporate officials. To phrase it more dramatically, but no less
accurately, there was a total abdication of public responsibility. Not
infrequently, railroad planning was so speculatively conceived and incompetently executed that the proposed line was never completed.
Waste and dishonesty in the expenditure of funds led to corporate
insolvency and abandonment of routes. Finally, even if the road was
completed and put into use, there was the danger of mismanagement
in its operation, which was free from any significant government con78

See note 91 infra and accompanying text.

79 See, e.g., City of Bridgeport v. Housatonic R.R., 15 Conn. 475 (1843).

See

generally Note, County Subscription to Railroad Corporations, 20 U. PA. L. Rnv.

737 (1872).
80 See Hn.IousE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 150; cf. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106
U.S. 487, 495 (1883).
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trol.1 The public was commonly burdened with enormous debt while
its interest in improved transportation, which motivated projects in
the first place, was completely or substantially frustrated.
The nineteenth-century experience which gave rise to the public aid
limitations demonstrates that if public funds are to be risked, the risk
must flow from public rather than private decision. Adequate protection of the public financial interest necessitates public control consonant
with public financial risk. However, in several jurisdictions in which
the state had directly participated in railroad and canal construction
and operation, the constitutional revolution went even further. Provisions that "the state shall not be a party to, nor be interested in any
work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such
work" were adopted. 2 This type of clause, invariably drafted as a
limitation on the state, has generally been interpreted not to limit political subdivisions."3 Unlike the public aid limitations, the internal
improvement clause is directed at financial risk flowing from public
decision making as well as that incident to uncontrolled private decision
making.84
The constitutional movement soon produced a complementary
judicial reaction-the enunciation of the public purpose doctrine8 5 Its
first clear articulation was by Chief Justice Black of the Supreme Court
86 This
of Pennsylvania in 1853, in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia.
was a taxpayer's suit which challenged the validity of several acts of
the legislature authorizing the city to subscribe to stock in specified
railroads, and to raise the necessary funds by borrowing. Although
holding the statutes valid, the court declared that it was implicit in the
state constitution that taxes could be levied only for public purposes.
A statute which purported to tax for purposes clearly unrelated to
government would be neither legislation nor taxation. A further implication of the opinion was that any purported tax statute which
crossed the public-private barrier would violate the due process clause
of the state constitution, as a taking of property for private use.
81 See HILLHOuSE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 152-53; see, e.g., Garland v. Board
of Revenue, 87 Ala. 223, 225, 6 So. 402, 403 (1889); Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v.
Mayor of New York, 152 N.Y. 257, 268-69, 46 N.E. 499, 501 (1897).
82 E.g., MicH. CoNsT. art. 10, § 14.
S3 Commissioners of Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 491-97 (1871);
Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 614-15 (1853) ; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195, 221-26
(1860), cited with approval in State ex rel. Martin v. Giessel, 252 Wis. 363, 371,
31 N.W.2d 626, 630 (1948). Contra, Attorney General ex rel. Brotherton v. Common Council of Detroit, 148 Mich. 71, 111 N.W. 860 (1907).
84 See Rippe v. Becker, 56 Miun. 100, 114, 57 N.W. 331, 334 (1894); State
ex rel. Jones v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 38, 91 N.W. 115, 116-17 (1902).
85 See generally McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. Rv.
137 (1930).
821 Pa. 147 (1853).
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This substantive due process argument-as a matter of state constitutional law-was later more clearly enunciated by other courts,"
and a number of state constitutions were amended expressly to incorporate the limitation 8 Thus was fashioned a powerful new judicial
tool. The public purpose doctrine was subsequently incorporated by
the United States Supreme Court into the fourteenth amendment; 89
but it is now clear that the Court will defer to the state legislatures in
the area of taxation so as to permit local economic experimentation."
While the public purpose doctrine has been characterized by the
courts as a limitation on the power to tax, it is more realistically a
limit on the spending power, except in the unusual case of a special
tax levied to finance a specific spending program. Both the public
purpose test and the public aid limitations, therefore, perform the same
general function as constitutional controls of expenditures.

IV. THE

PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PUBLIC AiD LIMITATIONS
IN THE COURTS

Since the public purpose test goes no further than the public aid
limitations, it need not be resorted to in any instance in which a specific
constitutional provision is applicable to cases involving alleged public
financial assistance to private enterprise, or, as it will be hereinafter
referred to, the enterprise aid issue. However, as was noted earlier,
the public aid limitations are not uniform in their applicability. Some
states have no public aid limitations, and those that do usually have
gaps in coverage, in that some governmental units are not limited or
that no restriction is placed on the use of current appropriations. 1 The
87
See Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871); People ex rel. Bay City v.
State8 8Treasurer, 23 Mich. 498, 501-02 (1871).
E.g., KY. CONST. § 171. See McAllister, supranote 85, at 138 n.2.
89Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); cf. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
90 The refusal of the Supreme Court to give the taxpayers any relief in Green v.
Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) and Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178
So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938) compels this conclusion.
91 In order to determine the extent to which the various public aid limitations
have been adopted and the diverse pattern which has emerged, a study of 30 state
constitutions was made, limited to the credit clause and the current appropriations
clause. (The stock clause is generally joined with the credit clause and, as explained
in note 156 infra, is of little practical importance today.) The results of this 30 state
study are as follows:
2
No credit clause limiting the state ......................................
1
Limited a credit clause limiting the state .................................

No credit clause limiting political subdivisions b ...........................

Limited a credit clause limiting political subdivisions ....................
No current appropriations clause limiting the state .......................
Limited current appropriations clause limiting the state ..................
No current appropriations clause limiting political subdivisions ............
a The term "limited" is used to refer to a limitation which is subject
being overridden by a specified procedure, such as a vote by the majority
voters in the municipality, or in the case of the state, a specified majority
2, § 29.
e.g., TENN. CoNsT. art. text.
the legislators. See,infra
and accompanying
b See note 196

6

4
16.
1
16
to
of
of
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public purpose doctrine, therefore, has independent significance in a
large number of states. However, since the historical development of
the public purpose test in enterprise aid cases has been very much
influenced by judicial interpretation of the public aid limitations, it is
unnecessary to treat the two types of restrictions separately in the
historical discussion which follows.
A. Late Nineteenth Century
Several judicial developments during the late nineteenth century
are noteworthy. One was the distinction between proprietary risk and
9 2 the Ohio court
enterprise aid risk. In Walker v. City of Cincinnati,
held that the credit clause did not prohibit municipal borrowing to
construct a publicly owned railroad. The court ruled that the credit
clause, unlike the internal improvement clause, was not directed at the
risks incident to decision making by public officers-hereinafter referred to as proprietary risk-, but was designed to prohibit the assumption of financial risks flowing from private decision making-hereinafter referred to as enterprise aid risk. The court, placing the first
important judicial gloss on the credit clause, stated that it interdicted
only "a business partnership between a municipality or subdivision of
the State, and individual or private corporations or associations." "
The Walker case thus indicated the continued stress on the need for
public control consonant with public financial risk.
Because many legislatures had adopted a credit clause directed
only at the state, 4 litigation involving the validity of municipal
railroad-aid bonds under the public purpose test was frequently before
the courts. The majority of courts continued to adhere to the Pennsylvania view in the Sharpless case that an exchange of public bonds
5
for corporate stock was valid under the public purpose doctrine.
Much reliance was placed on the vital economic importance of a viable
transportation system and the quasi-public character of the railroads,
illustrated by their exercise of the power of eminent domain, their
common-law duty to serve the public without discrimination, and the
9 6 In dealing with manufacpower of the state to regulate their rates.
9221 Ohio St. 14 (1871).
93Id. at 54. (Emphasis added.)

Q See cases cited note 69 supra. Where a credit clause was expressly applicable,
railroad-aid bonds were uniformly held invalid. See, e.g., Whitney v. Kentucky Midland Ry., 110 Ky. 955, 63 S.W. 24 (1901).
95 See cases cited note 69 supra, except for the Bay City case, 23 Mich. 499
(1871). Contra, Burlington & M.R.R.R. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 399424 (1862) (dictum-later contradicted in Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30
Iowa 9 (1870)); People ex rel Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452
(1870).
96ee Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 661-62 (1874) ; Stewart v.
Board of Supervisors, supra note 95, at 19-26; Commissioners of Leavenworth County
v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 519-536 (1871).
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turing corporations, however, the state courts uniformly followed the
Supreme Court decision in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,9 7 that the donation
of municipal bonds to private corporations or their exchange for stock
in such companies violated the public purpose test.'" The quasi-public
nature of the railroads, it was argued, distinguished them from other
forms of private enterprise.
These decisions demonstrate that even in the early stages of the
evolution of the public purpose doctrine, courts placed great emphasis
on the need for public control adequate to insure that the economic
objectives of the program-hereinafter referred to as the public purpose objectives-would not be frustrated. Donations of municipal
bonds to railroad companies, therefore, were viewed by the judiciary in
a considerably different light than the nondonative railroad-aid programs. Four courts-making up the numerical weight of authority in
the nineteenth century-struck down such plans. 9 The rationale of
their decisions is noteworthy. In Whiting v. Sheboygan & F.R.R.,1' °
for example, the Wisconsin court distinguished between municipal purchase of railroad stock and donative aid on the ground that purchase
made the municipality a part owner of the enterprise with legal remedies against the misapplication of corporate funds, while donation
denied the public any such control. In addition to drawing a firm line
between gratuitous and non-gratuitous aid, these four courts announced that in applying the public purpose test thereafter, they would
more carefully scrutinize programs that pledged the public credit, in
order to determine whether the public financial interest had reasonably
been protected. It was made clear that the constitutional revolution
that had given birth to the public aid limitations would have a marked
impact on the judicial development of the public purpose test.
B. Twentieth-Century Needs Versus ConstitutionalLimitations
1. Public Control-Transportation, Recreation, and Parking:
The Consumer Facility Cases
As the economy developed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, a new form of social overhead capital " became
9787

U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).

OSE.g., Central Branch U.P.R.

v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745 (1880); Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872); Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91
(1876).
99
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28 (1869) (per curiam) ; Detroit & H.R.R. v.
Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870); Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1868) ; Whiting v. Sheboygan & F.R.T., 25 Wis. 167 (1870).
100 25 Wis. 167 (1870).
101 See Rosrow, op. cit. supra note 68, at 24-26.
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necessary-high speed urban transportation. The need for public
financing was accordingly increasingly felt. Instead of a system of
100% public financing and operation, however, the dominant pattern
which emerged was that of mixed public and private financing, with
private operation in some cases and public operation in others. 10 2
The proposed construction of the New York City elevated system
produced the first case of direct challenge to a plan of municipal borrowing for the construction of a transportation facility which was to
be leased to a private party on a long-term basis. Having failed to
attract fifty-five million dollars in private capital, New York City
determined to borrow that sum iteslf in order to construct the elevated
and then lease the operation of it to a private party for a period of
between thirty-five and fifty years. The rates to be charged by and
the rules governing operations of the elevated were to be set by public
officers. The plan was attacked as an unlawful loan of government
credit to the operating corporation on the ground that the city was in
reality borrowing the necessary capital and then lending the proceeds
to the lessee, while the city retained only nominal title to the facility.
In Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor of New York,"0 3 however, the court, with two members dissenting, upheld the plan, emphasizing that it authorized spending public money for a public facility
which would, for all time, constitute a part of the streets of the city.
Private operation of the elevated was held to be ancillary to the
dominant purpose of the plan, and would not render it an unconstitutional loan of credit. The court felt that it would have been
anomalous to strike down a plan which harmonized so well the emphasis in our society on private enterprise with the absolute need for
public financing.'
Perhaps the dominant proposition emerging from Sun Printing
is that the so-called lease of the facility was more in the nature of a
contract to operate than it was a conventional real property lease. By
' 0 2 In Boston, a state board of trustees took over the operation of a private
corporation's entire urban transportation system. The state subsequently guaranteed
a new issue of company bonds. Public operation, however, assured sufficient protection of the public financial and transportation interests so that the plan was upheld
under the credit clause despite the fact that the term of the bonds was 40 years while
state management could terminate in 15 years. Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass.
523, 543-45, 159 N.E. 55, 65-66 (1927). For a somewhat similar decision arising
out of the Boston transportation problem, see City of Boston v. Treasurer, 237 Mass.
403, 130 N.E. 390 (1921), aff'd, 260 U.S. 309 (1922).
103 152 N.Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499 (1897).
104 The reasoning in Sun Printing has been followed by other courts. See, e.g.,
People v. City of Chicago, 349 Il. 304, 182 N.E. 419 (1932); Kittel v. City of
Cincinnati, 78 Ohio App. 251, 69 N.E.2d 771, appeal di.nissed, 147 Ohio St. 246,
70 N.E.2d 372 (1946) ; City Club v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 92 Pa. Super. 219, 231-32
(1927).
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its control over the rates charged and the manner of operation, the
municipality would be able to exercise sufficient control to insure that
the public purpose objective-economical, frequent, high speed transportation-was attained.
Sun Printing may profitably be contrasted with Lord v. City of
0 5 a case arising out of the proposed construction of the Moffat
Denver,"
Tunnel, west of Denver. A city commission had proposed to construct the tunnel at an approximate cost of four and one-half million
dollars, two-thirds of which was to be raised by city borrowing and
one-third by an interested railroad. The agreement between the city
and railroad provided for title to be held by the city and the tunnel to
be leased by it to the railroad at a rental designed to satisfy the interest
on the public bonds and payments into a sinking fund. Once the
municipal debt was retired, title was to pass to the railroad. The city,
however, was to retain perpetual easements for water and electricity
purposes. The railroad for its part covenanted to allow other carriers
perpetual use of the tunnel tracks under specified terms and conditions.
The Colorado court looked upon the plan as a joint venture between the company and the city-or as a naked form of public financial
assistance to the railroad-and therefore held it invalid under the
credit clause. That the city took title was deemed of little significance
in view of what realistically seemed to be a delayed contract of sale to
the railroad. The perpetual easements granted to the city were characterized by the court as an incidental consideration rather than the
dominant factor motivating the project. Further, the public interest
in insuring that other railroads could use the tunnel at reasonable
rates was held to be inadequately protected. In the Denver case, therefore, unlike Sun Printing, there was insufficient public control provided for the attainment of the public purpose objectives.
Post-World War IIcases relating to government acquisition and
leasing of recreation and off-street parking facilities continue to emphasize the need for adequate public control over the attainment of the
public purpose objectives. In a leading Florida case, a municipality
sought a decree validating a proposed issue of bonds, the proceeds of
which were to be used for the construction of a marina, auditorium,
and related facilities to be leased to a private corporation for a thirtyyear term.'0 6 The proposed agreement between the municipality and
the corporation reserved no power in the city to control the admission
fee to be charged by the lessee or any other aspect of operations. Even
105 58 Colo. 1, 143 Pac. 284 (1914).
106 City of West Palm Beach v. State, 113 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Sup. Ct 1959)
(alternative holding).
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though the bonds were obligations payable from a special fund and
not general debt,' the court held the proposed plan invalid under the
credit clause because of the city's surrender of control.
A number of other recent cases involving proposed leasing of
publicly financed facilities indicate that the Florida result is not limited
to applications of the credit clause but also occurs under the public
purpose test and, when eminent domain is involved, under the public
use limitation."0 8 In a recent Rhode Island opinion, for example, a
factual situation strikingly similar to that in the Florida case was
presented."0 9 The Rhode Island constitution contains no public aid
limitations applicable to municipalities. Nevertheless, the court held
that the failure of the municipal agency to reserve control over the
manner of operation of the proposed facility invalidated the proposed
issuance of bonds under the public purpose doctrine and the exercise
of eminent domain under the public use requirement.
Urban renewal cases further reinforce the control principle. Legal
attacks on the exercise of eminent domain for urban renewal purposes
have often centered on the fact that the cleared land is promptly
turned over to private redevelopers. In answering these attacks, supporters of renewal emphasize the significant degree of control reserved
by the public agency in its redevelopment agreement and deed restrictions, both of which insure redevelopment and subsequent use
of the land in accordance with the overall renewal plan." 0
Modern cases in the fields of recreation, parking, and urban renewal, although small in number, give positive indication of a judicial
tendency toward incorporating into the public purpose limitation on
107 The bonds pledged the revenues from a utilities service tax in addition to
the proceeds of the project. See State v. City of Tampa, 72 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1954).
108 City of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955) (eminent
domain and general obligation borrowing); Opinion to Governor, 76 R.I. 365, 70 A.2d
817 (1950) ; see Ventura Port Dist. v. Taxpayers of Ventura Port Dist., 53 Cal. 2d
227, 347 P.2d 305 (1959) (authority bonds); City of Daytona Beach v. King, 132
Fla. 273, 181 So. 1 (1938). Although the respective state constitutions contain a
credit clause applicable to municipalities, the opinions in both the Ventura and Daytona Beach cases rest on the public purpose test. Cf. Foltz v. City of Indianapolis,
234 Ind. 656, 130 N.E.2d 650 (1955); State ex rel. Hawks v. City of Topeka, 176
Kan. 240, 270 P.2d 270 (1954). Both Foltz and Hawks involve the exercise of
eminent domain and financing by bonds payable from project revenues and revenues
of a related facility. Cf. Zachry v. City of San Antonio, 296 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1956) (lease of city land). But cf. Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335
Mass. 53, 63 n.1, 65-68, 138 N.E.2d 618, 625 n.5, 626-28 (1956), appeal di47nissed, 354
U.S. 907 (1957) (tax exemption).
109 Opinion to Governor, mepra note 108.
110See Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 143-45, 104 A.2d
365, 369-70 (1954) ; Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99- N.H. -161, 168, 106 A.2d 571,
575-76 (1954) ; Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 48-51, 326 S.W.2d 699, 706-08
(1959).
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expenditures and the public use limitation on the power of eminent
domain the same requirement of public control over effectuation of the
public purpose objectives as has been applied under the credit clause.
Although twentieth-century cases have focused on the adequacy
of public control with respect to the effectuation of the public purpose
objectives, analysis of them in the light of the nineteenth-century evils
sought to be remedied-that is from the standpoint of public control
consonant with financial risk-is illuminating. It is apparent that the
twentieth-century formula of government ownership and private lessee
operation remedies the first two evils of the railroad-aid bond eralack of public control over the marketing of the public debt, and over
the planning and construction of the facility. In the few modern cases
in which the municipality failed to provide for control of the construction of the project, the proposed financing program was held invalid under the credit clause."'
The third danger which the public aid limitations sought to
prevent relates to the risks which result from lack of government control over the current operations of publicly owned enterprises. It is
clear that the municipality's title to the facility under the modern
formula constitutes a significant safeguard. Regardless of the financial
imprudence or recklessness of the lessee, the public financial interest in
the facility itself is protected. Nevertheless, there remains a significant
residue of financial risk. The public interest demands a maximum
assured rental, particularly while the debt is outstanding, yet percentage rentals have been approved,"' and at least two courts have
upheld leases wherein the rental payments were contingent upon earnings and made junior to debt service on the company's debt and dividends on a portion of its stock." 3 These arrangements have apparently
been approved on the ground that there is a sufficient residuum of
public control reserved over the lessee's operations.
In addition to lease provisions, long-run economic and social
changes are ever present sources of financial risk. Population shifts or
11 Griffin v. Jeffers, 221 Ala. 649, 130 So. 190 (1930); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 276 Mass. 617, 176 N.E. 607 (1931).
304, 182 N.E. 419 (1932); Frankenstein
112 People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill.
v. Goodale, 30 Ohio App. 110, 164 N.E. 363 (1928).
304, 337-41, 182 N.E. 419, 435-37 (1932);
"13 People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill.
Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912). But see
State ex rel. Campbell v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 97 Ohio St. 283, 119 N.E. 735 (1918).
While it was not apparent in Sun Printing, the above cases reveal that long-term
leasing of transportation facilities generally involves a union of private and public
capital in apparent violation of the Walker case dictum. Rolling stock and working
capital are joined with publicly owned subway tunnels and elevated structures. This
has tended to lead to an intimate integration of the company's and the city's debt
structure in the manner indicated in the text.
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widespread economic recession may cause the number of subway riders
to fall significantly, thus producing financial losses to the municipal
owner. These risks, however, are inevitable concomitants of public
decision making. Such basic decisions as whether to build the subway
and what route to select are public decisions. Accordingly, the Denver
case and those which followed it, in invalidating certain leasing arrangements in which private decision making was a factor, demonstrate that in applying the public control criteria, twentieth-century
courts have gone beyond those of the nineteenth in placing their crucial
emphasis on public control over the effectuation of the public purpose
objectives.
2. Urgency of Need: The Port Facility Cases
In the cases applying the public purpose doctrine and the public
aid limitations to the fields of transportation, recreation, and parking,
courts have placed considerable emphasis on the public importance of
the project and the urgency of the need for public financing. 114 These
factors have been most stressed, however, in the area of municipal construction of port facilities for long-term lease to private parties." 5
Courts have uniformly upheld use of the eminent domain power "' and
public financing by the issuance of general obligation"l and revenue
bonds 1 8 for such purposes.
114

The urban transportation cases, note 113 supra, approving lease arrangements wherein the rental payments to the municipal lessor are made junior to interest on the lessee corporation's debt and dividends on a portion of its stock, demonstrate that when the public importance of the objective and the urgency of the need
for public financing are great enough, concern for protection of the public financial
interest will be relaxed.
115 Public financing of port facilities for private operation has a long history.
It is clear that by the mid-nineteenth century the practice was well established in
New York City. GRiFFIw, THE PORT OF NEw YoRK 7 (1959). The practice in
New York has, in fact, been traced back to the latter part of the seventeenth century. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor of New York, 8 App. Div. 230,
287, 40 N.Y. Supp. 607, 647 (1896) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 152 N.Y. 257, 46
N.E. 499 (1897).
11
6In re Mayor of New York, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892); Dyer v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 140 Fed. 880 (C.C. Md. 1905), appeal dismissed, 201 U.S. 650
(1906) ; Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 Atl. 884 (1924).
1' City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 Pac. 328 (1929) ; State ex tel.
McElroy v. Baron, 169 Ohio St. 439, 160 N.E.2d 10 (1959) ; Paine v. Port of Seattle,
70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912); see Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89
N.W.2d 635 (1958). In the above cases, public financing was upheld under the
credit clause. Cf. Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 764, 107 S.E.2d 594 (1959) (current
appropriations).
118
Sigrnan v. Brunswick Port Authority, 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958);
North Carolina State Ports Authority v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 242 N.C.
416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955) ; Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 121 S.E.2d 615 (1961).
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In-analyzing public financing of port facilities, it is essential to
differentiate between the leasing of marine terminals which serve all
carriers, and that of piers which are used exclusively by one carrier.
In the case of terminals, the municipality can substantially regulate
wharfage charges and other aspects of operation. The control which
can be exercised is similar to that exerted in the consumer facility
cases. In the case of piers, however, it is constitutionally impossible
for the municipal lessor to control the rates and services of water carrier lessees who are engaged in interstate and foreign commerce.
Moreover, relatively short-term leases can be used effectively, in the
case of marine terminals, to afford the municipality the opportunity
of periodically reviewing the lessee's activities." 9 The carrier lessee,
however, like the industrial lessee, will usually want the security of a
long-term lease, or at least an option to extend a shorter term; and the
municipality for its part may not desire to pledge its credit unless the
term is sufficiently long so that rental payments will amortize the
principal and pay the interest on its debt.
While case authority exists for the use of eminent domain for the
construction of public piers which will be leased on a long-term basis
for exclusive use by a single carrier,' direct support for public financing of such facilities is scant.' 2 ' If the public control requirement, as
articulated in the consumer facility cases, is applied, such financing
cannot be sustained. Nonetheless, the author has found no holding
that public financing for this purpose is invalid under the credit clause
119 See generally U.S. COMM'R OF CORPORATIONs, REPORT
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES pt. III,

oN1TRANSPORTATION

By

at 6 (1910).

120 See cases cited note 116 supra. The following cases have also approved the
exercise of eminent domain in port areas and subsequent leasing for port and port
related industrial purposes. Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Ore. 596, 598-620,
321 P.2d 338, 340-50 (1958); Atwood v. Willacy County Nay. Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1955). But see Hogue v.
Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957) (sale rather than lease).
121 The California Supreme Court, in City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315,
274 Pac. 328 (1929), upheld municipal general obligation bond financing of a warehouse building in the port area which was to be leased for a ten-year term to a firm
engaged in packing, processing, and shipping dried fruit. The court rejected arguments based upon the public purpose test and the credit clause. The court was
completely silent on the importance, if any, of the limited term lease. Cf. Visina v.
Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 189, 89 N.W.2d 635, 646 (1958). In contrast, the Washington court in Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 322, 127 Pac. 580, 582 (1912),
approved a proposed lease of a marine terminal which was for a "limited time" and
which provided for municipal control over wharfage charges. The Ohio court, in
State ex rel. McElroy v. Baron, 169 Ohio St. 439, 160 N.E.2d 10 (1959), similarly
passed on a limited term lease. The statement in Paine on control of wharfage
charges, however, must be construed in the context of the facts of the case-a proposed leasing of a marine terminal. The court did not address itself even by way
of dictum to the question of leasing a pier for the exclusive use of a carrier. Both
the Washington and Ohio courts were unclear as to how they construed "limited
time." Paine, in .fact, approved a thirty-year term.
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or the public purpose test. 2 Despite the lack of direct authority, there
is good reason to believe that public financing of port facilities for longterm lease to water carriers is an accepted part of our jurisprudence
even though the lessor retains no control over the operation of the
facility, other than to limit the lessee to waterfront uses.'2s The validity of this type of public financing was not at issue in the eminent
domain cases, but it must have been perfectly clear to the courts that
public financing was involved. The practice of leasing publicly owned
piers to steamship companies, often for long terms, is of long standing,
and should therefore be accorded respect by the courts." 4 In addition,
even though the degree of control over the water carrier lessees which
can be exercised by the municipality is small, the lessees are common
carriers subject to common-law duties " and gradually expanding fedThis regulation, together with the program of federal regulation.'
eral subsidies,'1 27 serves to place water carriers in a very special category, much like the nineteenth-century railroad. Moreover, the historically asserted government interest in the control and development
of ports further justifies special treatment of this type of municipal
activity. 28 This concern is based on both the vital importance of ports
122But cf. Paine v. Port of Seattle; State ex rel. McElroy v. Baron, supra
note 121.
'23 See State ex rel. McElroy v. Baron, supra note 121, at 444, 160 N.E.2d
at 13-14; cf. City of Douglas v. Douglas Canning Co., 161 F. Supp. 379 (D. Alaska
1958). But cf. Belcher Sugar Ref. Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo.

121 (1884).

'24 See, e.g., In re Mayor of New York, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892);
Dyer v. Mayor of Baltimore, 140 Fed. 880 (C.C. Md. 1905), appeal dismissed, 201
U.S. 650 (1906); City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 Pac. 328 (1929);
see AlHioN, THE RISE OF NEW YORK PORT 222 (1939). Twenty-three piers owned
by the City of New York were under lease to steamship companies in 1952, twentyone of which were being used by steamship companies under a permit. N.Y. CITY
On the other
DEP'T OF MARINE AND AvIATION, PORT PROGRESS REPORT 33 (1952).
hand, only one of the thirteen municipally owned piers in Philadelphia which are
leased for port commerce purposes is leased for the exclusive use of a water carrier.
Letter From Peter Schuffler, Deputy Director of Commerce, City of Philadelphia, to
David E. Pinsky, Sept. 26, 1960. Furthermore, long-term leases have not been
uncommon. New York City leases now extend for as long as twenty years. See
GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 115, at 90. A federal agency report in 1909 criticized
the large number of long-term pier leases in New York and Baltimore. U.S. COMM'R
OF CORPORATIONS, op. cit. supra note 119, pt.

III, at 6,

11.

'25In re Mayor of New York, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043, 1046 (1892), placed
emphasis on this factor, in approving the exercise of eminent domain by the City
of New York to acquire waterfront land to be used for the construction of piers
for long-term lease to water carriers.
OF TRANSPORTA126 See AUERBACH & NATHANSON, THE FEDERAL REGULATIO
TIoN, 28-31, 35-38 (1953); Zoll, The Development of Federal Regulatory Control
over Water-Carriers,12 ICC PRAC. J. 552 (1945).
27
1 See AUERBACH & NATHANSON, op. cit. supra note 126, at 31-32.
128 See Commissioner v. Ten Eyck, 76 F.2d 515, 517-18. (2d Cir. 1935); Ports
and Harbors,12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 258 -60 (1937). The ownership and control of port facilities was historically regarded in England and Scotland
as a part of the royal prerogative. See GouLD, WATERS § 14 (3rd ed. 1900).
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to economic development and to national defense. Judicial opinions
and statutes have emphasized that public financing of port facilities is
looked upon as part of a comprehensive plan for the development of
the port.129
Economic considerations buttress the modern legal acceptance of
public financing of port facilities for long-term lease to water carriers.
The fact that an exceedingly small number of piers are owned by steamship companies suggests 0 that public financing is needed because private capital has not been forthcoming for this purpose. This need for
public financing is consistent with the concept that governments can
finance social overhead capital,1 31 which should be defined to encompass
port facilities. This form of capital has three characteristics: a large
investment is essential; the time needed to pay off such investments is
usually long; and by its very nature, social overhead capital indirectly
benefits the community as a whole rather than the initiating entrepreneurs. Because of these attributes, government units have often been
compelled to supply the economy's need for social overhead capital.
Piers and related port facilities clearly have the second and third
characteristics of such capital, and the first to a somewhat lesser extent; in fact, transportation facilities are generally deemed to be the
classic example of social overhead capital.
The port facility cases illustrate very pointedly that where attainment of the public purpose objectives is deemed sufficiently vital and
the need for public capital sufficiently urgent, the requirement of public
control under public financing will be substantially relaxed.
In summary, the history of the judicial application of the credit
clause to the enterprise aid issue in areas other than industrial financing
can best be explained as an attempt to balance two somewhat conflicting criteria. The courts first look to the degree of public control exercised over private decision making. This in turn can be analyzed from
two vantage points-public control exerted to insure the effectuation
of the public purpose objectives, and public control exerted for the protection of the public investment. 1.3

Twentieth-century courts have

1290City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 Pac. 328, 332-34 (1929);
Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 521, 126 Atl. 884, 887 (1924); cf.
Paine 0v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 318, 323, 127 Pac. 580, 583 (1912).
13 1n 1951, there was only one steamship owfied pier in Boston, three in New
York, none in Philadelphia, seven in Baltimore, and none in Norfolk. MoTT, A
SURVEY OF UNITED STATES PORTS 66, 141, 167, 59, 150 (1951).
131 The discussion of social overhead capital which follows is based on Rosrow,
THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

132

17-18, 24-26 (1960).

The nature of the citizen's interest in the effectuation of the public purpose

objectives of any public program will in many instances conflict with his interest
in protecting the public financial interest. In the case of a municipally financed offstreet parking garage, for example, the citizen's interest in protecting the public
financial interest is a narrow one; he is interested in minimizing the direct financial
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placed maximum emphasis on the former. The second criterion applied by the courts is the urgency of the need for public financing and
the availability or nonavailability of reasonable alternative sources of
capital to accomplish the public purpose objectives without sacrificing
the public control requirement. Public financing of port facilities for
long-term lease as exclusive carrier piers seems to be the only significant area in which urgency of need for public financing has achieved
dominance and virtually submerged the public control requirement.
These two criteria-the degree of public control exercised and the
urgency of the economic need-will be referred to hereafter as the
enterprise aid criteria. With respect to the application of the public
purpose test in states with no pertinent public aid limitations and the
application of the public use limitation on eminent domain, although
the number of cases is small, the evidence suggests that the same'
criteria have been employed and the same balance achieved.
V. THE TAX SUPPORTED PLANS

Analysis of the application of the public aid limitations and the
public purpose test to the current programs of state and municipal
industrial financing may now be undertaken. The contrast between
the several tax supported and revenue bond plans, however, is sufficiently fundamental to warrant separate treatment of the two categories. The objective of this section is two-fold: to apply the enterprise aid criteria to the tax supported plans in order to determine the
extent to which these plans depart from the body of decisional law
discussed earlier; and to consider whether these departures can be
harmonized with the historical guidelines underlying the public aid
limitations and the public purpose doctrine.
A. Application of the Enterprise Aid Criteria to the Mississippi Plan
1. The Albritton Rule Contrasted With the Rule of the Consumer
Facility Cases
The objectors in the Albritton ...case alleged that the BAWl
statute authorized outright municipal financial assistance to private enterprise in violation of the state constitution's credit clause and the
public purpose doctrine. The overwhelming weight of authority up to
loss incident to the enterprise, and if possible, in making it self-sustaining. This
may mean, for example, closing the garage from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. and raising rates.
On the other hand, optimum effectuation of the public purpose objectives of the
project may best be realized by 24-hour operation and low rates, even though direct
financial losses result.
133 Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed,

303 U.S. 627 (1938).
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that time had held that governmental financial aid to private manufacturers, by subsidies or guarantees of credit, violated both the credit
clause and the public purpose test; this was hornbook law from Dilto McQuillin.' 3 5 Virtually every case cited in the treatises, howlon ...
ever, had involved either outright donations of public property or bonds
to a private corporation, or an exchange of municipal bonds for corporate stock or bonds, and were thus reasonably distinguishable from
the BAWI plan. However, the Mississippi case of Carothersv. Town
of Booneville,'3 6 decided shortly before Albritton, had involved a program of municipal plant construction for long-term lease to private
industry, thus closely resembling the BAWI plan. The statute contested in Carothers had been declared invalid by the court four years
prior to the Albritton decision.
The Albritton court, however, had before it a statute well fortified
against the anticipated assault. The proposed project in Carothershad
been authorized by special legislation, no doubt pushed through the
Mississippi legislature in response to local pressure. It therefore
lacked any legislative finding of economic justification. In Albritton,
however, the court for the first time was faced with a statute which
launched an industrial financing program of general applicability
throughout the state and which carefully set forth legislative findings
of economic need justifying the pioneering legislation. Moreover, in
Carothersthe court had emphasized that because the municipality was
not authorized to operate the proposed plant itself, the statute permitted
outright financial assistance to a private manufacturing enterprise in
violation of the credit clause and the public purpose test. The BAWI
statute, however, had been carefully drafted to avoid the Carothers
objection by authorizing a municipality to operate a factory itself as
well as to lease it to a private party. It seems reasonably clear that the
legislature and the interested public officers did not anticipate any municipal operation, but had incorporated that alternative power into the
statute to bolster it against legal attack. 11 7 This defensive strategy
proved successful, for the statutory authorization for municipal operation became, in essence, the anchor of the court's opinion. Taking an
expansive view of the state's power to assume functions theretofore
not exercised by government when economic and social conditions so
dictated, the court held that the BAWI statute validly authorized the
use of municipal credit for construction of a new but necessary type of
DILLON, MUNICIPAL COP'ORATIONS § 884,
13 15 McQUILLIN, MuNIcn'AL CORPORATIONS
1342

at 1364-65 (5th ed. 1911).
§§ 43.30, 39.26, at 74-75 (3d ed.

1950).

136169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934).
137 See HOPKINs, MissIssiPPfs BAWI
Atlanta, 1944).

PLAN

16-20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
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public facility. Should the municipality prefer tenant rather than government operation, the lessee, according to the court, would be "the
. ."1
municipality's agent for operating the industry..
If the BAWI statute had not authorized municipal operation, the
court's position would have been untenable; but the judges felt very
much at ease with a scheme granting municipalities the power to construct a public facility with the optional power to operate it themselves
or through a lessee. The court found support in the transportation leasing cases. However, municipal power to build a facility which
municipalities were, in fact, legally without power to operate and which
was to be leased for a long term to a private party was a novel concept,
difficult to distinguish from direct financial assistance to private enterprise. In upholding the BAWI statute, the court thus relied heavily
on the pro forma statutory authorization of municipal operation.
Having distinguished Carothers,one major obstacle remained for
the court-to harmonize its decision with the enterprise aid criteria.
It attempted to do so by imposing a requirement that leases under the
statute set forth "the character and capacity of the proposed industry,
and [provide] for the termination of the lease if the lessee fails within a
specified time to . . . operate the industry as described .

.

. or

discontinues for a specified time thereafter to so operate it." 139 Such
a lease, it appears fairly certain, would give the municipality authority to prevent conversion of the facility to a use less desirable to the
community than that originally contemplated. 4 While the Albritton
38
Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 107, 178 So. 799, 807, appeal dis1
missed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
139 Id. at 107, 178 So. at 808; cf. City of Douglas v. Douglas Canning Co., 161
F. Supp. 379 (D. Alaska 1958) ; Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 92, 275 S.W. 29, 30

(1925).

140 The Albritton standard is implemented in Mississippi by a standard lease
provision that if the lessee abandons the premises or discontinues manufacturing
operations for a period of one year, the municipality may terminate the lease without discharging the lessee from liability for rent. Miss. AGRICULTURAL & INDUsTRIAL
BD., ATTITUDE flN AcTioN, form 5, para. 12. Whether the municipality can exercise
its right of termination for breach of the covenant restricting use of the premises
without a successor lessee being reasonably available, and then proceed to hold the
lessee liable for rent while the plant remains vacant, is a question subject to considerable doubt. Such action by the municipality would subject the lessee to a
penalty without yielding any apparent advantage to the municipality. Iowever, as
a practical matter the municipality would only be interested in enforcement if a
successor lessee who agrees to conform to the covenants limiting use is found.
Compare the following lease provision, in common use in Kentucky under the
revenue bond plan:
Immediately upon the completion of the industrial building and the installation of operating machinery and equipment the Company intends during
the term of this lease and until January 1, 1980, to use and occupy the said
building primarily in the processing and manufacture of vehicular rubber
tires or other products as determined from time to time by the Company,
as distinguished from warehousing space where employment of factory
workers is not important. The Company does not now know of any reasons why the said building will not be so used and occupied by it for
such period and anticipates that it will be so used and occupied by it in the

296

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.111:265

rule is hardly a strict one, it at least recognizes a need to adopt in
modified form the control requirement of the consumer facility cases.
The decisions which have followed Albritton, however, have ignored
the problem. 41
The actual degree of government control over the effectuation of
the public purpose objective achieved under the Albritton rule, however, falls far short of that required in the consumer facility cases. If
the requirements imposed in the latter cases were insisted upon in the
field of industrial financing, leases would have to include provisions
requiring a minimum weekly payroll, minimum wage rates, and minimum working standards.1 42 None of the modern industrial financing
programs, however, provide municipal control over any of these subabsence of supervening circumstances not now anticipated by it or beyond
its control. The Company agrees that when such building is used and occupied during the term of this lease or until January 1, 1980, it will be used
primarily only in the processing and manufacture of vehicular rubber tires
or other products, or as a factory, mill, shop, processing plant, assembly
plant or fabricating plant, but the failure to use and occupy the leased premises as aforesaid shall in no way abate or reduce the rent payable by the
Company to the City under the provisions of this lease.
City of Mayfield, Kentucky, Official Statement Relating to the Issuance of $9,500,000
Industrial Building Revenue Bonds Dated April 1, 1959, Contract of Lease and
Rent, 19.
141 Cases cited note 59 mrpra. The three leading cases are summarized below.
In City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957), the questioned
project involved construction of a manufacturing plant to be financed one-half by
the city and one-half by the manufacturing corporation. The city's contribution was
to be raised by the issuance of general obligation bonds. The city was to hold title
to the facility only until the corporation bad paid the city the amount of its investment and interest. The city was, therefore, a first mortgagee. The court did not
find the facility to be a public one but frankly characterized the plan as one of
financial assistance to industry. Industrial financing was then analogized to public
construction of port facilities for long-term lease. Since the Maryland credit clause
does not limit cities, the court's holding was that the public purpose doctrine had been
complied with. There is dictum, however, that the same result would follow under
the credit clause.
In Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956), the city proposed to
use the proceeds of general obligation bonds for the construction of an industrial
facility for lease to industry. The only legislative authority for the program, however, was a broad enabling statute authorizing cities of specified classes, upon finding
that it was "necessary to incur any indebtedness," to issue bonds in accordance with
the statutory procedure. There was, therefore, no legislative finding of economic
justification or express legislative authorization, deemed so important in Albritton.
The court, however, did impose on the-defendant municipality the burden of demonstrating that abnormal unemployment conditions existed in the area. This burden
was satisfied, and the bond issue upheld, under the credit clause.
In McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958), the
court upheld, under the public purpose doctrine, a statute modeled closely on the
BAWl statute, but lacking the pro forma grant of power for municipal operation
which the Albritton court deemed so significant. This difference, however, was of
no interest to the Tennessee court. The Tennessee Constitution, which allows a
loan of credit in aid of a private enterprise upon approval of three-fourths of the
voters (art. II, §29), was complied with. The vote of the electorate, however, did
not obviate the need for judicial determination of compliance with the public purpose test.
142 Cf. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 92, 275 S.W. 29, 30 (1925).
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jects. The lease provision commonly used in Mississippi 143 permits
termination only if manufacturing operations are interrupted for a continuous period of one year. Thus, as long as a minimal level of operations is maintained, the termination provision probably would not
apply, even though the payrolls being paid would greatly disappoint the
community's expectancies. Moreover, in case of default by the lessee,
the municipality's power to insure continuing payrolls under the present programs is considerably less than the control exercised by lessor
municipalities in the consumer facility cases. Once a transportation,
recreational, or parking facility is constructed, the very facts of its
existence and municipal ownership carry with them the assurance that
the public purpose objectives can be carried out. Regardless of the
financial failure of the lessee, the municipality can legally and realistically operate the facility itself or easily obtain a successor lessee. If economic or other changes preclude continued operation on a self-sustaining basis, the facility can be subsidized. In the case of municipally
owned industrial plants, however, there is far less certainty that the
default of the lessee will not interfere substantially with the continued
flow of payroll income. Generally, municipalities lack the legal authority to run industrial plants themselves; ...and even in Mississippi,
where the power exists, its exercise would be completely unrealistic.14
Municipal operation of manufacturing plants producing for distant markets would be completely out of harmony with American tradition and
practices. Accordingly, the only practical municipal alternative in the
face of lessee default under industrial financing is to find a successor
lessee. Even when economic conditions are favorable, the realities of
the industrial real estate market are such that a facility may remain idle
for a period of some months before a tenant who wants the particular
plant is found; when general economic conditions are unfavorable, several years may elapse before a new tenant is obtained. In addition to
the financial loss it causes, a vacant plant within the framework of public
industrial financing means a frustration of the public purpose objectives.
Accepted principles of state constitutional law in related areas may
by analogy impose a duty upon the BAWI lessee not to unreasonably
discriminate in selecting and discharging employees. Under the firm
rule of the nineteenth-century cases, otherwise private corporations
which may exercise the power of eminent domain or which receive
franchises to the use of public streets are under an implied duty to
143 See note 140 supra.
144The BAWI statute is the sole exception to this rule.

Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 8936-09 (Supp. 1960) permits municipal operation conditioned upon state approval.
145 See notes 144 and 137 supra and accompanying text. Municipal operation in
Mississippi has apparently never been implemented. Letter From Lester G. Franklin,

Ass't Attorney General, State of Mississippi, to David E. Pinsky, August 15, 1959.
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serve all members of the public without unreasonable distinctions. 4 6
While all of these cases involved corporations which occupied positions
of monopoly or oligopoly, one contemporary treatise writer has treated
them as supporting a more general rule applicable to all private enterprises which receive substantial government aid. 4" In the field of industrial financing this rule would impose an obligation upon the lessee
not to discriminate unreasonably in selecting and discharging employees. In each case, the corporation should be looked upon as an
instrumentality of the financing government for the attainment of specific public purposes-the provision of services to citizens as consumers,
and of employment to them as wage earners. In both capacities, the
ultimate beneficiaries of the program should be the local citizenry. Discrimination in providing consumer services is basically no different
than discrimination in providing employment opportunities. 48 Moreover, beyond state constitutional law, there looms a substantial federal
question under the fourteenth amendment. 4 '
The contrast between the degree of public control exacted by the
consumer facility cases and that required under the Mississippi plan
may also be examined in terms of protection of the public financial interest. The pattern of public financing under the BAWl statute, like
that in the consumer facility cases, remedies many of the grossest financial abuses of the nineteenth-century railroad-aid bond era. There is adequate public control over the marketing of the municipal bonds, and the
plants are constructed by the municipalities or by contractors under
their direct supervision. However, available evidence suggests that,
146 See Snell v. Clinton Electric Light Co., 196 Il1. 626, 63 N.E. 1082 (1902);
Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Keen, 135 Ind. 54, 34 N.E. 818
(1893); Lumbard v. Stearns, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 60 (1849); Haugen v. Albina
Light & Water Co., 21 Ore. 411, 28 Pac. 244 (1891).

147 2 MoRAWETz, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

1075-76 (2d ed. 1886).

The rule prohibiting discrimination would probably not apply in any case in
which a municipality, owning real property no longer needed for its former public
uses, decided to lease it to a private lessee in order to protect the municipality's financial interest. Cf. Derrington v. Plumber, 240 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 723 (1961) (dictum).
149 It is now well settled that the lessee of publicly owned property, engaged in
selling services to the public, is subject to the limitations of the equal protection
clause and may not discriminate in service. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961). By analogy, the Mississippi plan lessee may have a constitutional duty not to discriminate in employment. The restaurant and recreation
cases are grounded on the proposition that a private party engaged in performing
public purpose objectives on publicly owned property is subject to the same duty
under the equal protection clause as would be imposed on the public lessor. Industrial lessees under the Mississippi plan are engaged in performing public purpose
objectives on publicly owned property. Full analysis of the equal protection clause
question, however, would necessitate a discussion of many related problems not
germane to the problems of state constitutional law with which this Article is concerned. See Ming v. Horan, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958) ; Dorsey
v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1950).
148
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unlike consumer facility projects, municipal control of planning and
design in industrial financing is minimal, with much of the responsibility
being turned over to the lessee. Where a proposed plant is to be a
highly specialized one, built around highly specialized processes, and
where the project includes the public financing of equipment, 5 0 there
must inevitably be a virtually complete delegation to the lessee of planning and design. To the extent, therefore, that a project reflects the
image of a particularized manufacturing process, the public investment
will be jeopardized by private decision making. The admonition of
against the union of public and private
Walker v. City of Cincinnati...
capital, then, becomes significant. If, however, the needs of the lessee
can be fulfilled by a relatively adaptable plant, and if public financing
does not include payment for specialized equipment, municipal supervision is more feasible. Although a plant can seldom be fully adaptable,
workable distinctions can be made between those plants which are relatively adaptable and those which are relatively specialized. However,
only one court has considered the factor of adaptability pertinent.' 52
Another important consideration is the extent to which the municipality's title constitutes a financial safeguard against the risks, inherent in any manufacturing enterprise, which may arise during the
term of the lease. Subject to obvious inaccuracies of generalization,
business failures may be divided into those caused by internal factors,
relating to the quality of management, and those caused by external
ones such as changes in technology, demand, competition, and the business cycle. Many business failures, of course, are due to a combination
of internal and external factors, as competency in business management
includes the ability to forecast basic economic trends and to make intelligent adaptation to change. This internal-external dichotomy, however, will be used for analytical purposes. To the extent that the lessee's default is due to management failures, rather than to external
forces, the municipality's title to the plant, insofar as it is adaptable,
provides a reasonably good safeguard against substantial loss, although
a short period of vacancy may result before the industrial real estate
market produces a new tenant. When the default is due to forces
affecting the particular industry of the lessee, such as technological
150 The BAWI statute authorizes the financing of equipment. MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 8936-09 (Supp. 1960). The state agency, however, has recently instituted a policy
of not permitting the cost of machinery to be included in any bond issue. Letter
From W. P. Starnes, Ass't Director, Miss. Agricultural and Industrial Bd., to David
E. Pinsky, Dec. 16, 1960. The Tennessee and North Dakota statutes-patterned
after the Mississippi plan-do not include machinery. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2903
(Supp. 1962); N.D. CEiNT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-57-02, -19 (Supp. 1961). The revenue
bond statutes generally include machinery. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 511(20) (1958);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 103.200 (1959).
'5121 Ohio St. 14 (1871).
1 52See City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 Pac. 328 (1929).
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changes or changes in demand patterns, a relatively adaptable plant
again provides a reasonably good safeguard. If, however, default is
due to broad economic forces producing a national depression, or to
long-run forces adversely affecting the economy of the particular section or region where the plant is located, a long period of vacancy or
occupancy at a depressed rental may follow, causing serious financial
loss to the municipality. This risk, however, unless it is aggravated by
the specialized nature of the plant, is analogous to the long-run risk
incident in a subway system as discussed earlier. It is proprietary risk,
flowing from public decision making-the basic decision to invest public
capital in industrial plants.
To the extent, therefore, that it permits financing of nonadaptable
industrial projects, the Mississippi plan provides less public control
relative to financial risk than consumer facility projects. But even if
plants are made adaptable, the BAWl program still fails to meet the
test of the Denver case and the decisions following it with respect to
the adequacy of public control over effectuation of the public purpose
objectives.
2. The Albritton Rule Contrasted with the Rule of the Port
Facility Cases
The limited public control exercisable under the Mississippi plan
more closely resembles that which is exerted under judicially approved
programs of pier construction for long-term exclusive lease to carriers.
In both cases the lessor municipality cannot insure effectuation of the
public purpose objectives except to require the lessee to use the facility
at some minimal level of activity and for specified purposes only. But
even the port facility programs better protect the public financial interest than does the Mississippi plan where the latter finances nonadaptable plants. As with consumer service facilities, the risk to the public
financial interest in port facility investments is proprietary.
Port and industrial development perform similar functions in the
economy of the financing government. From the standpoint of the
port area, it is common to analyze the movement of goods by water as
involving two functions, the industrial and the commercial."5 3 When
the port moves freight originating in or destined for the port area, it
functions in its industrial capacity; when, however, it moves throughfreight the port performs a commercial function. In its industrial capacity, the port provides an essential service to local industry-transportation of raw materials and finished products-so that government
153 See BRYA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER TRANSPORTATION
OF CORPORATIONS, Op. ctit supra note 119, pt. III, at 2.

(1939); U.S. Comm'R
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financing of piers for lease to private parties very closely resembles
municipal investment in urban transportation, both being designed to
provide an essential local service. However, when the port functions
commercially, its activities resemble those of manufacturing industries
in terms of the role played in the economy of the area. The municipally owned pier is then providing services for other more distant
regions just as the municipally owned industrial plant provides goods
for them. The only public service performed by both activities is the
generation of additional income for the residents of the port area-both
primary payroll income and secondary income-due to the multiplier
54
effect.
Both legal and economic analyses, therefore, underscore a significant similarity between municipal pier and municipal industrial financing. However, there remain significant distinctions between them
which cannot be ignored: federal regulatory control over water carriers; less financial risk flowing from private decision making in the
case of port facilities; the long asserted preeminent governmental interest in all aspects of port development; and the economic status of port
facilities as essential social overhead capital. It follows, therefore, that
Mississippi plan industrial financing fails to satisfy the enterprise aid
criteria as applied in the port facility cases.
B. Application of the Enterprise Aid Criteria to, the Pennsylvania,
New England, and Oklahoma Plans
Mortgage plans of industrial financing have a common feature
which distinguishes them from the Mississippi plan. The government
of the state or municipality does not construct and then lease plants
itself. Instead, the government makes or insures mortgage loans to
local non-profit development corporations in order to enable the latter
to construct industrial facilities for lease or sale to private manufacturers. However, there is also a significant difference among the
mortgage plans themselves. The New England and Oklahoma plans,
because they pledge the public credit, are prima facie subject to the
credit clause. In contrast, the Pennsylvania plan, financed by funds
appropriated out of currently levied taxes, is not. The credit clause
clearly addresses itself only to incurring debt and not to making
appropriations from current revenues. 155 The stock clause is likewise
The current appropriations
inapplicable to the Pennsylvania plan.'
154 See note 178 infra and accompanying text.
155 See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
15 6 In several jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, no current appropriations
clause has been adopted limiting state financial action; only the credit and stock
clauses apply. See note 91 supra. Whenever such a state adopts the Pennsylvania

plan, with the credit clause clearly inapplicable, attention is focused on the stock
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clause, if adopted, and the public purpose doctrine, therefore, are the
only limitations to the Pennsylvania scheme of industrial financing.
clause.

Of course, even if the stock clause is inapplicable, the public purpose test

has prima face applicability. Since the state becomes a creditor rather than a shareholder under the Pennsylvania plan, the stock clause does not have literal application.
However, it can be argued that the policy against risking public funds in private undertakings which underlies that limitation calls for its application to the purchase of
mortgage bonds as well as stock, even though the public funds are subject to a lesser
degree of risk than if they were invested in corporate stock. Once the stock clause is
construed to include the purchase of mortgage bonds out of current revenues, it would
be incongruous not to extend it to embrace an even more flagrant problem-outright
donations to private industry out of current appropriations. The broad question
presented is whether the stock clause should be interpreted as coextensive with the
current appropriations clause, as well as with the credit clause.
The argument against such broad construction of the stock clause rests upon the
nineteenth-century background. Public financial aid to the railroads was effectuated
by four common methods-public guaranty of railroad bonds, exchange of public bonds
for private bonds, donation of public bonds, and exchange of public bonds for private
stock. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. The first three techniques
amounted to giving or lending of credit and were, therefore, prohibited by the credit
clause. But the fourth technique, the purchase of corporate stock financed by borrowing, was the most common technique in many states. It seems reasonably clear
that mid-nineteenth-century legislators made a clear distinction between stock subscriptions, even if financed as above, and a loan of credit. Stock subscriptions made
the public agency a part owner. The fact that the purchase was financed by borrowing did not convert the transaction into a lending of credit. See Clarke v. City of
Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 484, 489 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857), aff'd, 28 N.Y. 605 (1864)
(dictum that the credit clause did not prevent the state from being a stockholder

in a private corporation); 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF OHIo 523 (1850-51); 1 DEBATES OF THE
The court, as well as counsel,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IOWA 295-97 (1857).

in Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 37, 54 (1871) and the dissenting
opinion in Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 633 (1853), carefully distinguished between

a stock subscription and a loan of credit. Statutes authorizing stock subscription
and cases passing on them were careful not to characterize a stock subscription transaction as a loan of credit. An exchange of corporate bonds for public bonds, on the
other hand, was so characterized. See City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74, 75-78

(1857); Commissioners of Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 481-82, 487-88
(1871); Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 32
Pa. 218, 219, 222 (1858); Nichol v. Nashville, 28 Tenn. 251, 253-63 (1848); Pa.
Laws 1848, No. 224, § 1, at 273 (all involving stock purchases); Benson v. Mayor
of Albany, 24 Barb. 248, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); Commissioners of Knox County
v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260, 266-70 (1863) (involving loans of credit). As the constitutional movement of the nineteenth century reached its culmination, however,
there was a tendency to construe stock purchases financed by the issuance of public
bonds as within the proscription of the credit clause. See Hill v. Memphis, 134 IJ.S.
198 (1890); Baltimore & D.P.RR. v. Pumphrey, 74 Md. 86, 21 At. 559 (1891).
That there was a need for a constitutional limitation aimed directly at the stock
purchase technique was clear, but the verbal form it should take was not. In large
measure, the evil sought to be remedied was not stock purchase per se, but stock
purchase financed by the use of public credit. See Garland v. Board of Revenue,
87 Ala. 223, 225, 6 So. 402, 403 (1889); Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 468-69, 138
N.E. 849, 852-53 (1923) ; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 33 (1869) ; Walker v. City
of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 53-54 (1871) ; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 631-32
(1853)

(dissenting opinion); 1

DEBATES

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

OF

However,
IOWA 289-344 (1857); HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 143-99 (1936).
the pattern of exchanging corporate stock for public bonds so dominated the day that
except in Indiana, see IND. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6, almost no one gave consideration to
the possibility that stock ownership might be financed by other means than borrowing.
The clause that emerged, therefore, was a very simple one that purported to cover
an area wider than the evil sought to be remedied.
In the light of the above historical background, it is suggested by some that the
stock clause be limited to a proscription of stock purchased by the incurring of debt.
In several of the states with which we are concerned-those in which the public
aid limitations directed at state action are limited to the credit and stock clauses-
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Since state funds under the mortgage plans are loaned to a nonprofit development corporation, it might be asserted that no limitations
are applicable. Some courts have held that the public aid limitations 157
and the public purpose test "I do not prohibit public financial aid to
certain non-profit organizations."5 9 While there is considerable opposing authority in the case of the public aid limitations,1" it is not necessary to resolve that conflict here, as industrial development corporations are sharply distinguishable from non-profit associations. The
latter are generally charitable associations, which operate educational
or recreational facilities, such as museums or zoos. In doing so, the
non-profit association itself acts as a quasi-public instrumentality for
achieving public policy objectives. The same is not true of nonprofit development corporations. They are not the primary agents for
achieving public objectives, but only serve as conduits through which
public funds flow to private manufacturers who ultimately benefit the
public. 161 To rely on the non-profit organization feature of the mortthe same constitutional conventions which adopted credit and stock clauses limiting
the state and municipalities also adopted current appropriations clauses directed solely
at municipalities. Compare IDAHO CONST. art. 8, §2, with id., art. 12, §4; Compare
PA. CONST. art. 9, § 6, with id., art. 9, § 7. It was clearly recognized that in order
to restrict appropriation of public funds from currently levied taxes for use as donations or for the purchase of stocks or bonds, an additional constitutional limitation
was necessary. The final decision of the framers to adopt a current appropriations
clause, applicable to municipalities, but not to the state, seems to rest on a determination that there was no strong need to so limit state financial action. In this group
of jurisdictions, therefore, the argument for limiting the stock clause to the purchase
of stock by the incurring of public debt is especially persuasive.
The suggested result is certainly a reasonable one. The incurring of public debt
is a substantially greater danger to the taxpayer than an expenditure out of current
revenues. It is hardly unreasonable for the constitutional conventions to have acted
to prevent the greater evil, while remaining silent on the lesser.
157 Furlong v. South Park Comm'rs, 340 Ill. 363, 172 N.E. 757 (1930) ; Hager
v. Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 86 A.2d 892 (1952); cf. McGuire v. City of
Cincinnati, 40 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941), appeal dismissed, 139 Ohio St. 218,
38 N.E.2d 1023 (1942).
5
'1
Legat v. Adorno, 138 Conn. 134, 83 A.2d 185 (1951) ; City of Minneapolis v.
Janney, 86 Minn. 111, 90 N.W. 312 (1902).
159 This is apparently the view of the former Secretary of Commerce of Pennsylvania. See Davlin, State Development Corporations: The Pennsylvania Experience, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 92-93 (1959).
160 Fluharty v. Board of County Comm'rs, 29 Idaho 203, 158 Pac. 320 (1916);
State ex rel. Board of Control v. City of St. Louis, 216 Mo. 47, 89-95, 115 S.W. 534,
546-48 (1909); Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 Pac. 892 (1914).
161
The dictum in Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439,
462, 105 A.2d 614, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1954), is particularly pertinent:
But the prohibition contained in Art. VIII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution [the
credit, stock, and current appropriations clauses] should not receive too
narrow a construction. Clearly, if the public body receiving the appropriation were a mere channel through which public money were to be invested
in a private corporation, thus making the City a creditor or stockholder
of such a corporation, the transaction would be illegal.
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gage plans, therefore, as immunizing them from constitutional scrutiny,
is to lean on a slender reed.
The mortgage plans abandon the fagade of a publicly owned
facility and make apparent the reality of financial assistance. They are,
therefore, even less able to satisfy the enterprise aid criteria of the
consumer facility cases than the Mississippi plan. Analogizing to
FHA program, states and municipalities in their capacities as mortgagees or mortgage insurers can impose restrictions on the use of
premises, so as to prevent their conversion to uses less desirable for
the local economy,' 62 but the feasibility of doing so is limited." Moreover, once a mortgage is satisfied, control over effectuation of the public
purpose objectives is at an end.'6
C. The Public Aid Limitations-Conclusions
The constitutional validity of the tax supported plans, under thecriteria applied in the consumer facility cases, is questionable. Municipalities are better immunized against certain types of risk than they
were under the nineteenth-century railroad-aid bond plans. Nonetheless, except in the case of a fully adaptable plant, the public assumes a
considerable financial risk incident to private decision making; and in
all instances inadequate public control is reserved over the effectuation
of the public economic objectives. The judicially approved port
facility programs more closely resemble the Mississippi plan, but, as
already indicated, the two are legally and economically distinguishable.
In applying the enterprise aid criteria, courts have failed to distinguish carefully between the public aid limitations and the public
purpose test. This failure is unfortunate and should not become a
principle of state constitutional law. Both the public aid limitations
and the public purpose test have similar origins, but they are significantly different in form. The public aid limitations were adopted
as a specific constitutional response to particular evils which plagued
the "take-off" period of the nineteenth century. These limitations,
when construed against their historical background, have a specificity
16 2 Cf. FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
163 In view of the unorthodox nature of such restrictions in mortgages, there may
be a reluctance on the part of industry to agree to such terms. So far as enforcement
is concerned, see note 140 supra for discussion of the related problem in the case of
the Mississippi plan.
16 The degree of public control which can be exercised to safeguard the public

financial interest is reduced, under the mortgage plans, if control over the construction of the facility is delegated to the development corporation. However, this need
not be done; the public agency can exercise as close a control over construction as
is possible under the Mississippi plan. Of course, under all plans, the degree of
control which can be exercised over construction will depend in large part on the
extent to which the project involves a specialized plant and equipment rather than
an adaptable plant with no public financing of equipment.
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rooted in nineteenth-century experience which limits their constitutional elasticity-their capacity to sustain changed interpretation in
the light of new conditions. Thus, the tax supported plans not only do
violence to the language of the public aid limitations, but to their
historical spirit. Fortunately, only two states, Mississippi and Kentucky, have sustained tax supported plans under public aid limitations; .. the other decisions favorable to tax supported public industrial financing come from jurisdictions in which there is no pertinent
public aid limitation. 16 The Mississippi-Kentucky approach is not
satisfactory. In the interest of the integrity of our judicial system,
specific constitutional limitations deemed obsolete by a subsequent
generation should be eliminated by amendment rather than by judicial
accommodation. A similar conclusion is suggested with respect to
internal improvement clauses. 67
1 5
6 Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 110-12, 178 So. 799, 809-10, appeal
dismiissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938); Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky.
1956).
16GAndres v. First Arkansas Dev. Fin. Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97
(1959), and Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Industrial Dev. Corp., 226 Ark. 620,
291 S.W.2d 802 (1956), both sustained statutes authorizing the state to invest a
portion of the surplus in the state treasury in bonds of non-profit development corporations. These corporations were engaged in making mortgage loans to industry.
Since the state did not incur debt or contingent debt, the credit clause was deemed
inapplicable. The court in Halbert, however, invalidated a provision of the same
statute which authorized municipalities to purchase membership in a local non-profit
industrial development corporation, holding it violative of the constitutional prohibition against any grant of financial aid by municipalities to private enterprises.
Id. at 625-26, 291 S.W.2d at 806. The Kentucky court upheld the Pennsylvania plan
in Industrial Dev. Authority v. Eastern Ky. Regional Planning Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d
274 (Ky. 1960). The current appropriations clause applicable in the state, however,
is limited to donations. Ky. CONST. § 177. A variant of the Oklahoma plan was
upheld in City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957), and the
Mississippi plan was sustained in McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314
S.W.2d 12 (1958). Maryland has no credit clause applicable to cities; the Tennessee
constitution allows a loan of credit upon approval by three-fourths of the votes cast
at an election and this provision was satisfied. TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 29.
167 For the background of the internal improvement clause, see text accompanying
notes 82-84 supra. The question presented is whether this limitation should be construed rather narrowly to proscribe only those particular evils in the minds of the
nineteenth-century draftsmen-aid to transportation facilities. The answer of the
courts has generally been in the negative. Minnesota has invalidated the proposed
construction and operation by the state of a grain elevator or warehouse. Rippe v.
Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N.W. 331 (1894). Alabama has invalidated state concentration produce markets which would be competitive with private industry. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 237 Ala. 429, 187 So. 244 (1939). More recently, Wisconsin
has held invalid the use of state funds for veterans' housing. State ex rel. Martin v.
Giessel, 252 Wis. 363, 31 N.W.2d 626 (1948). But see In re Opinion of the Justices,
247 Ala. 66, 22 So. 2d 521 (1945); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 750, 107 S.E.2d 585
(1959). Underlying these decisions is the conviction that the constitutional intention
was to draw a clear line between functions strictly necessary to the exercise of
sovereignty, on the one hand, and other functions "which ordinarily might, in human
experience, be expected to be undertaken for profit or benefit to the property interests
of private promotors. . . ." State ex rel. Jones v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 38, 91
N.W. 115, 116-17 (1902). As applied by the courts, therefore, the internal improvement clause has been construed as a vigorous, inflexible version of the public purpose
limitation. According to these courts, the internal improvement clause clearly proscribes all industrial financing programs which pledge the state's credit or which
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D. The Public Purpose Test-Conclusions
The public purpose test emerged as a response to the same problems which led to the adoption of the public aid limitations. But the
nineteenth-century cases which approved nondonative railroad-aid
bonds, indicate that its highly generalized verbal anatomy has the
same elasticity as do the concepts due process and equal protection
under the federal constitution. Judge Learned Hand's description of
the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments may aptly be applied to the
public purpose doctrine-it is "cast . . . in such sweeping terms that
[its] . . . history does not elucidate [its] . . . contents." 168
Since the meaning of this limitation has the capacity to change
with the times, pertinent factors must be judicially determined to
direct the nature and course of its evolution. It is significant that the
decision in Loan Ass/n v. Topeka' 6 9 in 1875, invalidating industrial
aid bonds under the public purpose test, coincided with the beginning
of an important transformation in the United States Supreme Court's
philosophy of judicial review.'
In the 1870's and 1880's the Court
began to abandon in practice its pre-Civil War attitude of self-restraint.
While it continued to reiterate the principle that any rational doubt
was to be resolved in favor of contested statutes, the Court passed upon
economic regulatory legislation as would a policy making body. This
philosophy has, of course, now been replaced by one of rigorous selfrestraint and liberality, permitting maximum legislative economic experimentation. Economic legislation will not be disturbed unless the
challenger overcomes a presumption of constitutionality by demonstrating that the statute "is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators." "'
The approach of the Supreme Court is destined to exert a profound impact on the development of the public purpose test in state
courts. Economic regulatory and national security legislation may impinge upon one relatively small economic, social, or political group contrary to the mandates of the first, fifth, or fourteenth amendments. On
use current appropriations from the state treasury. While this type of inflexible
constitutional limitation may be regretted as a matter of policy, the interpretation
is the one most in harmony with nineteenth-century constitutional history. As in
the case of the public aid limitations, constitutional amendment should be looked to
as the appropriate route for change.
168 HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30

(1958).

169 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 661-67 (1875).
17o See Barnett- Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 39
MicE. L. REv. 213, 232-37 (1940).
- 71 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ; see Carolene
Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1944); AFL v. American Sash
& Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 543-44, 555-57 (1949) (concurring opinion).
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review, courts assume that the political processes may be inadequate to
protect them. In contrast, programs of public spending do not require
sacrifice from any one group, but from all taxpayers in accordance with
existing patterns of taxation. There is, therefore, more reason for
courts to assume that the normal political processes will be adequate to
protect the public." 2 While conflicts between economic groups are
very much in evidence during the drafting of tax legislation, the resolution of these differences must necessarily be left to the poltical arena,
subject to federal and state constitutional limitations on the taxing
power.
The danger that judicial scrutiny of constitutionality may degenerate into policy review by a super-legislature is present with greater
force in the case of public spending than regulatory enactments. In
passing upon regulatory legislation, courts can at least attempt to balance the public benefits to be attained against the private sacrifices
called for. As difficult as the judicial task may be in these cases, it
would be considerably more difficult to develop meaningful standards
by which to review an appropriation or bond issue for industrial financing purposes which represented an average tax burden of only a few
dollars a year. There is good reason to consider the public purpose
issue as approaching the political question limit.
A countervailing consideration, however, must be weighed. Implicit in the philosophy of rigorous judicial self-restraint, at least where
no problem of federalism is present, is the assumption that a reasonably
healthy legislative institution exists. Unfortunately this is not the
fact in most states. As Dean Fordham has recently pointed out, state
legislatures are underdeveloped in power, structure, and procedure.'
The typical legislature meets only in short biennial sessions; its powers
are sharply limited by detailed restrictions which interfere with a
healthy exercise of independent judgment; and its members are generally poorly paid and without professional staffs. The capacity to
make intelligent and independent policy decisions depends in good part
on thorough committee work, but the weakness of the committee system in state legislatures is pitiful. Unless significant reforms are carried out, state courts may well be reluctant to give the same degree of
deference to local legislative judgment as the Supreme Court gives to
congressional decisions.
Although the condition of the state legislative institution militates
against judicial self-restraint, the time is ripe for the public purpose
172 Today, unlike the nineteenth century, the mass media and numerous civically
oriented citizens groups play an important role in informing taxpayers of the issues
involved in taxation and spending questions.
173 See FoRDAm, THE STATE LEGISLATIVE INSTITuTION 11-76 (1959).
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doctrine to tear itself away from strict adherence to the enterprise aid
criteria as applied in the consumer facility cases and to evolve independently as a more relaxed limitation on state and municipal financial
action. Encouragingly, modern industrial financing cases reflect, to a
considerable extent, a movement in this direction. 4
This conclusion, however, does not carry with it any imperatives
as to the content of the new standard. At least two possibilities exist.
One course is to adopt the Supreme Court's "rational basis" standard
of review in economic regulatory matters. A persuasive policy argument can, of course, be made against financing industrial projects by
issuance of general obligation bonds. The public assumes the risk of
economic loss without any offsetting guarantee that its objectives will
be attained. Moreover, it has been forcefully asserted that it is much
sounder in competing for industry to expend limited municipal resources to improve educational, recreational, street, and other traditionally public facilities than to finance manufacturing plants. 5 But
under the rational basis test these views do not assume constitutional
dimension.
Economic considerations do furnish a rational basis for legislative
determinations to finance industrial development. The urgent economic need to alleviate unemployment and to raise standards of living,
and the curtailment of nongovernmental investment in manufacturing
plants, provide good reason for using public capital,1 7 ' and courts have
77
in fact been influenced by these considerations.
Increased knowledge of area economics, particularly of the importance of the local multiplier concept, further supports the legislative
determination that has been made. Under the local multiplier concept
the productive activity of a community is divided into two types, basic
and derivative. 178 Basic activity produces an inflow of income from
174 See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
175 See GILMORE, DEVELOPING THE "LITTLE ECONOMIES" 62 (Comm. on Economic
Development Supp. Paper No. 10, 1959); INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASS'N,
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SERVICE, THE CITY'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(Rep. No. 177, 1958); UNIV. OF ALABAMA, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND IN-

DUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHEAST (1952); Laws and Attitudes in the
Industrial Development of the South, 2 J. PUB. L. 63, 85-6 (1953).
See also the
clear emphasis on factors other than industrial financing in COMM. ON INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT, REPORT TO THE SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE (1961).
176 See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text. In making federal funds
available for industrial financing under the Area Redevelopment Act, Congress has
recognized and in effect approved state and municipal industrial financing activities.
75 Stat. 51 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. §2505(b) (9) (B) (Supp. 1961).
177 See notes 64-65 mipra and accompanying text.
178 See WEIMER & HOYT, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE 319-60 (3d ed. 1954);
UNIV. OF NEBRASKA COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE COMMUNITY EcoNOMIC BASE AND MULTIPLIER (1958) ; Andrews, Mechanics of the Urban Economic
Base, 29 LAND ECON. 161 (1953). While the multiplier concept seems elementary,
only in the last three or four decades has it been articulated in formal terms and
applied to various communities in field studies.
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the export of goods to other areas or the purchase of goods and services in the area by tourists. Derivative activity, on the other hand,
produces a net flow of income away from the area. Manufacturing is a
principal form of basic activity. The essence of the multiplier concept
is that every increment of investment in a basic activity has a leverage
effect, increasing or decreasing employment and payrolls in the basic
sector. The volume of derivative activity will vary accordingly. The
local multiplier is determined by dividing basic employment into total
employment. When a state industrial financing program successfully
attracts a manufacturing industry, the ensuing economic gain to the
community is measured not only by the company's payroll but also by
the amount of secondary income induced by it, which will vary from
area to area depending upon the local multiplier. The concern expressed by the Supreme Court in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka 7 that public
financial assistance to manufacturing must ineluctably lead to similar
programs to assist "the merchant, the mechanic, [and] the innkeeper,"
therefore, proves to be unwarranted. A reasonable line can be drawn
between basic and derivative activities and public industrial financing
The argument for sustaining industrial
confined to the former."'8
financing legislation under the rational basis standard is, accordingly,
persuasive.
Due to the close historical relationship between the public purpose
doctrine and the public aid limitations, and to the weakness of the
state legislative institution, some courts may be reluctant to apply the
rational basis test to industrial financing legislation. They may prefer
to apply a modified enterprise aid standard of review, which departs
less decisively from the criteria applied in the consumer facility cases.
Under this standard, the enterprise aid criteria would be used as a
framework for reasoned anlysis rather than as strict requirements; the
urgency of the need for public financing would be given greater weight
and the public control requirement relaxed. Courts could demand only
that degree of public control which is realistically possible. Prohibitions against unreasonable discrimination in employment, for example,
are economically feasible and might well be required. The lease provision currently used in Mississippi, prohibiting conversion of the plant
to a nonmanufacturing use, is also practical. Although payroll controls are probably not possible, municipalities can better control the
effectuation of economic objectives and safeguard the public financial
interest by bringing the process of project selection under more intelligent public direction. The courts can insist that statutes require pub179 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 665 (1875).
180 The industrial financing programs have generally observed this line in practice.
See notes 47-49 mipra and accompanying text.
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lic industrial financing to be carried on only in a context of comprehensive local economic planning.
Compliance with the modified enterprise aid standard would call
for municipal preparation of an economic base study, in which all the
facts necessary to an understanding of the area's economy are assembled
and organized."' A development plan, containing area goals, should
then be formulated, in accordance with the base study. The broad economic goals of all areas are to a considerable extent identical. They
are directed toward a viable economy, customarily described in terms
of stability, balance, and worker productivity." These goals, however,
are only meaningful if related to the resources and skills which the particular locality currently possesses, and to its potentialities for future
development."
An economic development plan should include, as an
integral component, plans for public and private action to improve
the quality and quantity of services upon which industry is generally
dependent-water, electricity, gas, and industrial waste disposal-together with plans to expand the community's facilities to technically
train workers. 8 4 The evidence is persuasive that industries, in deciding on plant location, give substantial weight to all aspects of community life-health and recreational facilities, the educational system, the
local transit system, housing, and the quality of local government. 18 5
A comprehensive economic development plan must incorporate a master
program for the community's development in these fields. Once the
81

The discussion of economic base studies and economic development plans is
based on CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 117-28 (1957); HERRING, SOUTHERN
INDUSTRY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1-8 (1940); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, PRE1

PARING YOUR CITY FOR THE FUTURE-HOw

TO MAKE AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF YOUR

COMMUNITY (Tech. Bull. No. 29, 1956); INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' Ass'N,
MANAGEMENT

INFORMATION

SERVICE, THE CITY'S

ROLE IN

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(Rep. No. 177, 1958).
182 Stability refers to the capacity of the economy or of an industry to withstand
fluctuations in the business cycle and to minimize seasonal business variations.
Balance refers to diversification of productive activity in an economy which requires
a wide range in the type of economic activity including manufacturing, trade, construction, finance, and government, as well as variety within the all-important manufacturing category itself. Productivity refers to the goal of a high value added by
the manufacturer per wage earner reflecting itself in a high wage rate. See CHAPIN,
op. cit. mrpra note 181.
183 Two of the goals articulated in a recent economic base study of an area in
western Pennsylvania were to attract industries using semi-finished steel as a raw
material and those employing female labor. PENNSYLVANIA ECONOMY LEAGUE, AN
ECONOMIC BASE SURVEY OF THE SHENANGO

26-30 (1956).

VALLEY AREA AND

MERCER

COUNTY

184 See UNIV. OF ALABAMA, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHEAST (1952) and other authorities cited note 175 .rpra.
The significance of the factors mentioned is underscored by the recently enacted
Federal Area Redevelopment Act which places major emphasis on loans and grants
for public facilities which "will tend to improve the opportunities . . . for the successful establishment or expansion of industrial or commercial plants . . ." and
financial assistance to promote the occupational training and retraining of unemployed
and underemployed persons. 75 Stat 52-3, 58-60 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2506-07,
2513-14 (Supp. 1961).
185 See authorities cited note 175 supra.
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master plan is prepared, each industrial financing project should be
certified by appropriate state or local officials as in conformance with
it to the extent that such conformance is realistically possible."8 6
This recommendation is by no means novel."8 7 But it could be
argued that it does not rise to constitutional dimension. No court
has held that the constitutionality of industrial financing legislation depends upon conformity to an economic development plan. 8 One
court has invalidated legislation even though it did so." 9 We have
already noted, however, the emphasis in the port facility cases on comprehensive planning for the development of the port.'
In urban land
use planning as well, one of the principal themes is that the legality of
a single act may well depend upon its relationship to a well considered
master plan. Taking by eminent domain of unblighted as well as
blighted properties under urban renewal legislation is constitutionally
justified under the public use limitation because the taking is integrated
186 In making this certification as to whether the proposed industrial financing
project is in conformance with an overall economic development plan, the approving

officials should in addition consider the plant adaptability. See notes 150-52

mepra and

accompanying text. While the failure of the plan to provide for an adaptable plant
or its inclusion of equipment financing should not make the project unacceptable
per se, this should be one factor to be weighed.
In order to preclude frustration of the plan by subsequent action of the industry
in shifting the use of the plant to some less desirable use, it may be necessary to
incorporate use restrictions in the lease or mortgage. However, radical shifts in
the use of a facility will often be the product of adverse economic conditions, and
covenants limiting use would, under these circumstances, become realistically unenforceable. See note 140 supra.
187 Legislation in Washington authorizes the creation of port districts with authority to take so-called marginal lands by eminent domain, to develop them for port
and industrial purposes pursuant to a comprehensive plan, and to levy a tax for these
purposes. WAsHr. REV. CODE §§ 53.25.020-.900, 53.36.100 (Supp. 1959). Despite the
requirement of a compresensive plan, the statute was held invalid as authorizing a
taking for a private purpose. Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P2d
171 (1959). The Federal Area Redevelopment Act requires a comprehensive economic
plan as a requisite for eligibility. 75 Stat. 50 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2505(b) (10)
(Supp. 1961). Analogous provisions are found in the Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat.
623, 625, 626, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451(c), 1455(a), 1460(b) (Supp. 1961).
188 But cf. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 528, 114 A.2d 514 (1955). The court
was asked for an advisory opinion.on the validity of proposed legislation creating
an authority with power to develop real property for industrial parks, including power
to construct industrial plants. The state treasurer was authorized to purchase the
authority's notes. The court ruled that the proposed statute would be invalid because
it failed to set forth standards guiding the authority in its determination that a
proposed project would serve a public purpose and because it did not require the
agency to make a formal finding of public purpose, preferably after a public hearing.
While the approach of the New Hampshire court and the view espoused here are
certainly distinguishable, they are related by a common concern with the need for
additional safeguards after the legislature has determined that industrial financing
is for a public purpose. The New Hampshire court resolved its concern by a traditional approach-legislative standards and a hearing. This approach, however,
is of limited practicality in industrial financing, where legislative standards must
necessarily be even more general in nature than usual. To require the appropriate
officers to engage in comprehensive economic planning, however, and to relate each
project to such a plan is feasible and in general harmony with precedent in related
areas of public law.
189 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
190 See note 129 sipra and accompanying text.
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with a rational plan for area renewal.' 91 Conformance with an overall
plan normally is statutorily required in zoning.192 To the extent that
the requirement approaches a test of reasonableness, the statutory provision imposes a constitutional due process standard.'9 3 If an economic
base plan is required, the general taxpayer will be protected against
arbitrary action somewhat in the manner of an owner of real property
affected by zoning and eminent domain.
None of the current tax supported plans satisfies the modified
enterprise aid standard. Their defects, however, can easily be remedied
by legislation. Whether a given state adopts the rational basis test or
the modified enterprise aid standard, or continues to adhere strictly to
the original enterprise aid requirements, will depend not only on the
factors discussed in this section but on the intensity of the economic
The type of plan before the court may
need for public financing.'
also be significant. A reasonable line can be drawn between the Pennsylvania plan, which rests on current appropriations, and those plans
which rest upon general obligation debt or public guarantees of credit.
Because the latter obligate the community, including future taxpayers
unrepresented in the legislature, for a generation or more, a stricter
standard of judicial review may be applied to them. The Pennsylvania
plan might be judged by the rational basis standard, while the other tax
supported plans are required to comply with the modified enterprise
aid standard.
E. Credit Clause Directed at the State-Applicability to Municipalities
Several states have adopted, in addition to the other public aid
limitations, a credit clause which is directed in express terms only at
the state.' 95 This limitation should not be construed to embrace political subdivisions, unless it is a fundamental statement of public
policy. The majority of courts have adopted the narrower view that it
applies only to the state.' 9 6 This result is more consistent with the intention of the adopting conventions. There is no evidence that the
public aid limitation provisions were the result of sloppy draftsmanship
19 See Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
192The majority of state enabling acts follow closely the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act of the Department of Commerce. Section 3 contains the "comprehensive
plan" requirement. U.S. DEP'T OF
NANCES 10 (1928), reprinted in 2

COMMERCE, SURVEY OF ZONING LAWS AND ORDIRATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING

877-82 (3d ed. 1960).

193 See Haar, "In Accordance With a Connprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REv.

1154, 1170-75 (1955).
194 See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
195 E.g., ME. CONST. art. 9, § 14. See generally note 91 mipra and accompanying
text.
196 See authorities cited note 69 supra. Contra, State ex rel. Beck v. City of
York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W2d 269 (1957); Ops. IowA ATr'y GEN. 80 (1938);

SECRIST, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON PUBLIC
INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 63-64 (1914).
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rather than of careful consideration; indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. In Iowa, for example, the constitutional convention of 1857
gave lengthy consideration to the merits of imposing public aid limitations on cities and counties, and to the interrelationships between such
limitations and similar limitations on the state. 19 7 The constitution
which was finally adopted had a credit and stock clause directed only
at the state; and it would be difficult to conclude that this was not the
result of deliberate choice. In addition, state constitutions generally
differentiate in all financial areas between provisions applicable to the
state and those applicable to political subdivisions. The lending of
credit should be no exception. To apply the credit clause to the state
but not to its political subdivisions is not unreasonable. The problem
of excessive state debt may well be more serious than that of municipal
debt. Also, a constitution may reasonably permit local experimentation in aiding economic development while restricting the state from
doing the same thing.
VI. THE

REVENUE BOND PLAN

The revenue bond plan is a type of municipal industrial financing
only in a limited sense. Because the public credit is not pledged, the
bondholders must look for repayment to a special fund fed solely by
rental revenues. In the typical revenue bond project, the municipality
agrees to construct and equip a manufacturing plant in accordance with
plans and specifications approved by a private corporation and then
lease it to the corporation for a term of twenty to twenty-five years.
A rental is fixed which will amortize the bonded indebtedness and pay
the interest charges during the term of the lease. The agreement
usually is a net lease, under which the lessee is obligated to maintain
the premises and to pay all insurance premiums. Both the facility and
the bonds are tax exempt. 9 At the close of the primary term, the
lessee usually has an option to extend at a nominal rent, often by successive short-term renewals. In many instances the lessee has an
assured occupancy for a total period of fifty to sixty years. The lease
usually can be freely assigned or the premises sublet without the consent of the municipality. It is also common for the lessee to be
granted an option to purchase during the primary term by satisfying
the municipality's debt and interest charges, or after the close of
the primary term, by paying a nominal sum."9' Although the
city, therefore, holds title to the land and facility, the corporation is
1971 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IoWA

289-344 (1857).

198 See notes 224-28 infra and accompanying text.

199 This description of a typical revenue bond plan is based on Newberry v. City
of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) ; Bennett v. City of Mayfield, 323
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guaranteed the right to use the facility for virtually all of the useful
life, so long as it pays the principal debt and interest, discharges its
duties to maintain the facility, and keeps it properly insured.
The Kentucky court has aptly characterized the municipality's
role as that of a trustee."°
More precisely, it can be analogized to
a trustee under a mortgage deed of trust. The municipality, like the
mortgage trustee,2 01 is basically a conduit for funds flowing between
the user of the facility and the bondholders. It even assumes certain
duties similar to those of the trustee, 2 including the handling of the
revenues and the preservation and enforcement of the lease.2 0 3 The
differences between the mortgage trustee and the municipal issuer of
industrial revenue bonds are relatively slight. While the mortgage
trustee does not hold legal title, 4 the municipality does. The mortgage trustee also has no equity in the property, but the municipality
has a proprietor's right to possession if the lessee fails to exercise any
of its options to extend the term or to purchase.2 0 5 Opportunity to
exercise these rights, however, will be unlikely to occur if the facility
has any market value. Even if the lessee no longer needs the plant
S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1959); Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80
(1950) ; Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 36-37,303 P.2d 920,932 (1956)
(dissenting opinion); Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 202 Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d
373 (1957); ALABAMA STATE PLANNING AND INDUSTRIAL DEv. BD., THE PROCEDURE
FOR ISSUING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS BY MUNICIPArrITES 24-27 (Reprint
1959) ; City of Mayfield, Kentucky, Official Statement Relating to the Issuance of
$9,500,000 Industrial Building Revenue Bonds Dated April 1, 1959, at 29; City of
Scottsville, Kentucky, Official Statement Relating to $850,000 Industrial Building
Revenue Bonds Dated June 1, 1960, at 23-24. The picture presented is a typical or
composite one. There are, of course, variations. The power of Alabama municipalities to grant purchase options is qualified by opinions of the Attorney General's
ruling that the option is valid under the credit clause only if based upon more than
nominal consideration. Ops. Ala. Attey Gen. to Hon. Pleas Looney, Director, Alabama Planning and Industrial Dev. Bd., May 6, May 16, & Aug. 5, 1957.
2
00 Bennett v. City of Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Ky. 1959) ; Faulconer v.
City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 474, 232 S.W.2d 80, 84 (1950).
201 For a discussion of the functions and duties of the trustee under the mortgage
deed of trust, see 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES §§20-21.3 (1943).
202 The fact that commercial trustees are sometimes designated to perform these
functions, as well as the usual duties of a mortgage trustee upon default, does not
detract from this analysis. In such cases, the municipal trustee has merely delegated
some of its duties.
203 Compare the analysis of public building authorities by Professor Morris. A
building authority constructs a public building, finances it by the issuance of its bonds,
and then leases it to a traditional unit of government. Since the authority has no
other unpledged income, the bondholders rely exclusively on the rental income received
by the authority. Under Professor Morris' analysis, the building authority, realistically
a conduit of funds, can be looked upon as a trustee under a mortgage deed of trust
and the lessee government is realistically the debtor. Morris, Evading Debt Limitatiotts With Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234, 243-50 (1958).
204 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 201, § 20, at 127-29.
205
The municipality will, of course, take possession upon lessee's default. But
in that case, it will be under a duty to the bondholders to re-lease upon terms similar
to those in the prior lease.
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for its own business, it can avail itself of the usually unrestricted right
to assign or sublease.
The majority of decisions have sustained the validity of the revenue bond plans under the public aid limitations and the public purpose
test. The courts have held that a statute which pledges only project
revenues does not pledge the public credit, and therefore does not
lend the public credit in aid of anyone."° The public purpose test and
the public aid limitations have been identically treated. Of the four
courts that invalidated revenue bond statutes, two relied on both the
credit clause and public purpose test, 20 7 one on the credit clause
alone, 20 and one on the public purpose test alone.2"0
These minority courts"1 0 and law review commentators 21 1 have
asserted that several factors justify the invalidation of revenue bond
statutes under the credit clause and the public purpose test. Public
officers who administer the plans must perform various duties similar
to those of the mortgage trustee, including fixing and collecting rentals
and providing insurance coverage. It is alleged that it is improper
for them to be so occupied. If so, taxpayers have a valid interest in
the proper use of officers' time. Further, the use of officers' time can
be translated into an expenditure of public funds-a given percentage
of their salaries. In addition, improper performance of their duties
by municipal officers may create municipal, liability to bondholders or
others. Even if that does not occur, a default by the lessee might produce a default on the bonds which would adversely affect the city's
credit status.
It is important to determine how significant these arguments are
to the application of the credit clause. The first factor, officer time and
its financial component is de minimis." When due deference is given
to the legislative judgment, the application of either the credit clause
or the current appropriations clause for this reason is weak indeed.
206 See cases cited note 63 supra under the heading "Plans upheld."
207 State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957);
State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
208 Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767
(1960).
20
9 McClelland v. Mayor of Wilmington, 159 A.2d 596 (Del. Ch. 1960). Although
the Delaware Constitution contains a credit clause applicable to municipalities, article 8,
section 8, the court did not rely upon it.
210 See cases cited note 63 supra under the heading "Plans held invalid"; Village
of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 37, 303 P.2d 920, 932-33 (1956) (dissenting
opinion).
211 Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems Related to Municipal Bond Financing,35 VA. L. Rv. 285, 294-95, 306-07 (1949) ; Note,
Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bmd Plans, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 898, 902 (1953); Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing For
Industrial Developivnt, 70 YAIE L.J. 789, 792-93 (1961).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

316

[Vol.111:265

The second danger, potential municipal liability flowing from improper performance of official duties, presents a more serious problem.
A considerable number of courts, dealing with special fund-special
assessment bonds, have imposed liability on the municipality for failure
to levy adequate assessments

212

and for misappropriation of moneys

collected,
either on a theory of implied contract 214 or of negli2
15
gence.
There is some indication that similar rules would be applied
in the case of revenue bonds. 1 Most of the revenue bond statutes in
the field of industrial financing, however, contain exculpatory clauses,
drafted as strongly and precisely as possible to immunize the municipality from such liability.2 17 The effect which courts will give them
is still uncertain.
Nonetheless, even if these clauses are liberally construed, municipal activity in connection with an industrial financing project, like
any municipal activity, creates an ever present potential for tort or
contract liability to persons other than bondholders, a type of liability
which seems to be outside the scope of the exculpatory clauses. 218 On
balance, however, the risk presented by potential tort or contract liability is quite small.
In any case, the possibility of municipal liability does not necessarily bring the issuance of revenue bonds within the credit clause.
The trustee under a mortgage deed of trust is not regarded as pledging
his own credit because the courts can impose liability for breach of his
duties. To hold the credit clause applicable because of the possibility
of tort liability runs counter to the closely related line of cases holding
that special assessment bonds, payable from a special fund, and revenue
bonds are not debt for the purpose of state constitutional debt limitations-notwithstanding the possibility of tort liability. 19 If no debt is
1

212 See 15 MCQUIILIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 43.136, 43.161 (3d ed. 1950) ;
Note, Municipal Liability Upon Improvement Bonds, 44 Hagv. L. REv. 610, 613

(1931).

'213E.g.,

Rothschild v. Village of Calumet Park, 350 Ili. 330, 183 N.E. 337 (1932).

214 E.g.,

Nagle Engine & Boiler Works v. City of Erie, 350 Pa. 158, 38 A2d 225

(1944).

215 E.g., City of Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed. 329, 334,
(8th Cir. 1905).
346-48
21
6 Getz v. City of Harvey, 118 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
628 (1941); cf. RFC v. Municipal Bldg. Corp., 63 F. Supp. 587 (D. Me. 1945);
Public Market Co. v. City of Portland, 171 Ore. 522, 587-90, 130 P.2d 624, 649-51
(1942). Contra, Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 229 Ala. 50, 155 So. 859 (1934)
(dictum).
21 E.g., AA. CoDE tit. 37, §§ 511(23)-(24) (1958).
218 See Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 229 Ala. 50, 56, 155 So. 859, 864 (1934)
(dictum) ; Springfield Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 41 Tenn.
App. 254, 293 S.W.2d 189 (1956).
219 City of Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed. 329, 346-48 (8th
Cir. 1905); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. City of Calumet, 391 Ill. 280, 294-98, 63
N.E.2d 369, 375-77 (1945); see 15 MCQUILI=N, MUNICIPAL CoR'oRAniows §§ 41.31.32 (3d ed. 1950).
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created, logically there is no lending of public credit. Application of
the credit clause to the revenue bond plans inhibits experimental
economic legislation by unreasonably stretching the clause to cover
potential evils not within its spirit and never contemplated by the
framers of the limitation.
The third factor-possible adverse effect of a default on the city's
credit-perhaps comes closest to the rationale of the public aid limitations. If this should materialize, the municipal officers would be
faced with a number of unhappy choices, all of which would impinge
directly on the taxpayer: assuming the debt as a moral obligation;
refunding at a higher interest rate; financing future capital improvements out of current taxation; or cancelling planned improvements.
Whether default on industrial revenue bonds would adversely affect
a municipality's credit standing and, if so, to what extent, are questions that require delicate prediction based upon technical expertise.
Unfortunately, those who have concluded that the danger is realistic
have done so on the basis of informed speculation only.220

To rebut

the presumption of constitutionality, those who attack revenue bond
industrial financing legislation should support their position by reliable testimony from investment bankers.121 Only when the probability of damage to the municipality's credit rating is properly established on the record, should courts face the question of how much
weight should be accorded this factor. In any event, it would be
necessary to overrule or distinguish the cases which have upheld
special fund obligations under debt limitations. Such overruling
would effectively strike down all special fund financing; but the doctrine of these cases is too entrenched to render this an actual possibility. Yet to distinguish them away is also difficult, for both constitutional debt limitations and credit clauses were intended to protect
taxpayers from heavy future taxes levied to pay for recklessly incurred past debt, a danger plainly not present with revenue bonds.
While damage to credit standing is a related evil, it is of a lesser
magnitude. Due deference to the legislative judgment again dictates
not a broad interpretation of the credit clause that would prohibit
220 See Bessemer Inv. Co. v. City of Chester, 113 F.2d 571, 574 (3d Cir. 1940);
Harbold v. City of Reading, 355 Pa. 253, 257-58, 49 A.2d 817, 820 (1946).
22
1 The expectancy that the municipality will support bonds out of general funds
to prevent a default may be greater in the case of special assessment bonds and nonindustrial revenue bonds than revenue bonds. They are issued for improvements
which have traditionally been deemed public in nature and are at the vital core of
community life. In contrast, any perceptive investor purchasing industrial development revenue bonds would rely exclusively on the general credit of the lessee corporation.
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legislative pioneering, but a relatively strict interpretation which would
limit the credit clause to what is conventionally regarded as debt. The
credit clause should not, therefore, be a bar to revenue bond plans.
The validity of these plans under the public purpose test follows
a fortiori. The rationale of the judicial restraint espoused earlier in
connection with the public purpose test as applied to tax supported
plans leads logically to an even more limited concept of review of
revenue bond programs. The modified enterprise aid standard is only
justified by the need to protect present and future taxpayers against
the serious tax burden flowing from recklessly incurred debt. Except
to the extent that credit standing is impaired, this consideration is
irrelevant to revenue bond financing. Just as Pennsylvania plan
financing calls for less judicial scrutiny than plans which incur general
obligation debt, so revenue bond plans call for an even more relaxed
standard of judicial review. Judicial examination of revenue bond
industrial financing legislation should be limited to a determination of
whether the statute rests upon a rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.
As in the case of the tax supported plans, the rational basis which
supports the revenue bond plan is the urgent need for more community
income and the lack of private financing for industrial expansion.
However, the revenue bond plans do not, in actual operation, provide
public financing; the municipality, as "trustee," merely facilitates
private borrowing by "lending" the lessee its federal tax exemption
on municipal bond income and its state property tax exemption. State
courts need not determine whether this use-or misuse--of tax exemptions is reasonable."
To do so would be to enter a "political
thicket" which should be avoided. The question of exploitation of the
tax exemptions can more appropriately be left to Congress, the Supreme Court, and the state legislatures." v
With this troublesome
problem removed from consideration, the only question before a state
court is whether there is a rational nexus between the economic need
which cannot be met by private financing, and the use of revenue
bond financing. The responsive analysis is the same as in the case
of the tax supported plans; again, the argument for not disturbing the
legislative judgment calls for the use of the rational basis standard.
2

= See note 53 supra and accompanying text.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), held that
Congress could not constitutionally levy a tax on the income from state or municipal
bonds. More recent decisions in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941),
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939), and Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) cast doubt on the continuing validity of Pollock.
223
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VII. STATE TAX EXEMPTION UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI AND REVENUE
BOND PLANS

The Mississippi and revenue bond plan statutes are generally silent
on the question of tax exemption for the financed industrial facility.'24
In states where the Mississippi plan rests upon constitutional amendment, the amendments are also silent on this point. As a matter of practice, however, these facilities have been treated as exempt, 2 5 and the
one court which has faced the question has upheld exemption. 2 In
contrast, the statutes generally expressly exempt the bonds issued to
finance the project,2 2 7 but tax exemption for revenue bonds has been
held invalid under the uniformity clause by the one court to which
the question was presented. 2
In many states, the constitution-in some states as a mandatory
provision,2" and in others as a grant of authority to the legislature 0
-- exempts municipal property used for public purposes from taxation. Even in the absence of such a provision, courts have reached
the same result."3 The exemption will be referred to as the public purpose exemption. Under the public purpose exemption, the validity
of an industrial financing program does not imply a tax exemption,
as "public purpose" need not have the same meaning when used as a
limitation on public expenditures as it does when used as a restriction
on tax exemption.3 2
In some other states the constitutions exempt municipal property
from taxation regardless of the use to which it is put.2 " Accordingly,
once a court approves a financing program, there is no serious question
of state law with respect to tax exemption, except in the case of revenue
bond plans

34

224
The Mississippi statute is an exception. Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-21 (1956)
expressly exempts the public facility from taxation.
225 See Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 71-73, 334 S.W.2d 633, 641-42 (1960);

Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 36-37, 303 P.2d 920, 932 (1956)
(dissenting opinion); GILmoRE, DEVELOPING THE "LIttLE" EcoNomics 62 (1959).
22
6Wayland v. Snapp, supra note 225, at 71-73, 334 S.W.2d at 641-42.
227 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2913 (Supp. 1962) (Mississippi plan); ALA.
CODE tit. 37, § 511(30) (1958) (revenue bond plan).
228 Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 349, 353 P.2d

767, 775 (1960).
229 E.g., Aim. CoNsT. art. 16, § 5.
230 E.g., IND. CONsT. art. 10, § 1.

231 See 51 Am. JUR. Taxation §§ 557, 562, 569-76 (1944).
232

See Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 78, 334 S.W.2d 633, 644 (1960) (dissenting opinion); City of Cleveland v. Carney, 172 Ohio St 189, 174 N.E.2d 254

(1961); In re Township of Moon, 387 Pa. 144, 127 A.Zd 361 (1956); FoRDHAm,

THE

STATE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION 83-84 (1959).
233 E.g., IDAHO CONsT. art. 7, § 4.
23
4 If we apply the earlier characterization of the municipality's role under the
revenue bond plan as that of a trustee under a mortgage deed of trust, a serious ques-
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A number of cases have held that public income-producing property leased to a private lessee is not used for a public purpose for purposes of tax exemptionm 5 However, this body of cases is of limited
significance. Unlike the leases involved in those decisions, the principal goal of industrial financing programs is not to produce rental
income. The receipt of rent is no more a vital objective of public
industrial financing than it is when municipal airport property is leased
to an air carrier. In addition, the cases referred to usually arose in
a context of conflict among taxing units; the underlying problem presented was that of apportioning an economic burden among taxing
units.2 36 This problem of allocating economic burdens does not, how27
ever, generally loom as a significant difficulty in industrial financing.
The economic benefits of tax exemption under the Mississippi and
revenue bond plans are passed on directly to the lessee who generally
has an assured occupancy for virtually the entire useful life of the facility. The crucial problem is whether exemption of the facility from
taxation unreasonably discriminates among taxpayers. Virtually every
state constitution contains a uniformity clause, which at the very least
tion is presented as to whether the facility should be deemed public property for tax
exemption purposes. The exemption of public property has generally not been applied
in cases where the municipality is acting as a trustee for private persons. St. Louis
v. Wenneker, 145 Mo. 230, 47 S.W. 105 (189); City of Seattle v. King County,
3 Wash. 2d 26, 99 P.2d 621 (1940); cf. Calvin v. Custer County, 111 Mont. 162,
107 P.2d 134 (1940) (upholding an exemption on property to which the United
States held equitable title under a contract of sale).
25Cty of Cleveland v. Carney, 172 Ohio St. 189, 174 N.E.2d 254 (1961); In re
Township of Moon, 387 Pa. 144, 127 A.2d 361 (1956) ; Public Parking Authority v.
Board of Property Assessment, 377 Pa. 274, 105 A.2d 165 (1954) ; see 51 Am. Jun.
Taxation §§ 573-76 (1944).
236 See Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation. in the United States,
18 MINN. L. REv. 411, 426-28 (1934) ; note 237 infra.
2 37
The underlying problem typically presented in litigation challenging the tax
exempt status of publicly owned property is one of allocation of economic burden
among taxing units. See Stimson, supra note 236. If a county-owned airport is
located in townships A and B, the effect of tax exemption is to compel A and B to
participate in the operating costs of the airport. Even if the townships provide no
services, considerable areas which would otherwise be taxable are withdrawn from
the tax rolls. Residents of townships A and B, therefore, contribute to the airport
in a dual capacity as township taxpayers and as county taxpayers; taxpayers in townships C and D, however, contribute only as county taxpayers. See, e.g., In re Township of Moon, 387 Pa. 144, 127 A.2d 361 (1956).
This problem of allocation of burden among taxing units is generally not a problem of first magnitude in industrial financing. While it is difficult to anticipate all
possible conflicts among taxing units, some are set forth here. The Mississippi and
revenue bond plan statutes commonly grant authority to cities to construct a project
outside the municipal limits. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2903(1) (Supp. 1962).
If a city should utilize these powers to construct a plant in the unincorporated area
beyond its limits, the tax exemption would be borne by all county taxpayers equally.
Since both the direct and indirect economic benefits will normally be felt over an
entire county, county taxpayers can hardly complain about the allocation of burden.
A less likely possibility is presented by the construction of a facility by the county
government within the city limits. Here, city residents could justly complain of
having to contribute both as city taxpayers and as county taxpayers for a countyinitiated project.
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forbids unreasonable classification of taxpayers.2 38 In the few states
which lack such a provision, an equal protection clause subsumes the
same requirement.23 9 In construing the public purpose exemption
therefore, courts must harmonize it with the prohibition against unreasonable classification so as to accord vitality to both. This task will
not necessarily be accomplished by equating the public purpose limitation on expenditures with the public purpose exemption. In a very real
sense, the fundamental question concerns the validity of a subsidized
pattern of industrial financing. Without the element of tax exemption,
the Mississippi plan can be looked upon as only a minimal subsidy; and
this is true a fortiori of revenue bond plans. The emphasis suggested
here may seem inconsistent with the traditional approach which treats
the problem of selection and exemption of objects of taxation independently of the question of appropriation of public funds.2 40 On
closer consideration, however, there is no conflict. Unlike the typical
tax exemption problem, the Mississippi and revenue bond plans present
the question in a special context-one in which public financing is
bound up with tax exemption. Because of this, courts may well abandon the traditional approach for a more realistic one which considers
the tax exemption issue as one element in a complex program.
The factors which support the use of public industrial financing do
not necessarily apply to the question of the reasonableness of classification for purposes of tax exemption. Public financing is necessary because of the critical need to expand incomes and the paucity of private
long-term investment in industrial expansion. However, there is no
reason to believe that industrial lessees need the indirect subsidy of tax
exemption any more than do manufacturers who construct new plant
facilities with private financing. Quite to the contrary, the manufacturer who with great difficulty obtains private financing at high interest
rates may have the greater need of tax relief. It is also possible that
the economic benefits to the community derived from his activity may
be greater than those realized from lessees of municipal facilities. A
number of states grant tax exemption to all new manufacturing industries for a fixed term, or even an indefinite term,241 with judicial ap238

See

NEwHoUSE,

CONSTITUTIONAL

UNIFORMITY

AND

EQUALITY

IN

STATE

TAXATION 9-11 (1959).
239 See id. at 595-600.
240 See, e.g., Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 Pac. 203 (1930) ; Baker
and Curry, Taxpayer's Paradise in the Caribbean, 1 VAND. L. REv. 194, 199-201
(1948) ; Stimson, supra note 236, at 419.
2 41
- n some states, this is accomplished by constitutional amendment, and in
others by statute alone. See Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducenents to Industrial Location, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 618, 626 n.66 (1959), where the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth.
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proval.2 42 The validity of the classification in public industrial financing, however, is considerably weaker. It rests precariously on the fact
of legal title in the municipality, the only differential between the exempt class of manufacturing enterprises and all others.
The public purpose limitation on public spending and the public
purpose exemption should not be equated but rather, in approving tax
exemption under the public purpose exemption, courts should require
a higher degree of public control over the project than is exacted under
the public purpose limitation on public expenditures. A decree holding
the tax exemption invalid for failure to satisfy the entreprise aid criteria
would not be unwarranted. As a minimum, compliance with the
modified enterprise aid standard should at least be required for tax
exemption, with the proviso that the approving officials be required to
certify that both the public financing and the exemption are necessary
and in harmony with the area economic development plan.
Where state tax exemption for the facility is expressly incorporated into the industrial financing statute, as in Mississippi, there is
the additional consideration of deference due to the legislative judgment. However, in this instance the position advanced with respect to
the problem of classification should prevail over the presumption of constitutionality; unless the safeguards of the modified enterprise aid standard are met, tax exemption should be held invalid under the uniformity
clause, as an unreasonable classification.24 3
A similar conclusion is merited with respect to the validity of the
statutory exemption commonly granted owners of industrial revenue
bonds from state personal property and income taxes. The economic
benefits of these exemptions are also passed on to the lessee. Accepting
the characterization of the municipality as analogous to a trustee under
a mortgage deed of trust, the exemption of these bonds seems equally
unreasonable unless the requirements of the modified enterprise aid
standard are met.
2 42

See, e.g., Crafts v. Ray, 22 R.I. 179, 46 Atl. 1043 (1900); 2 COOLEY, TAXATiON §§ 757-58 (4th ed. 1924) ; cf. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)
(dictum).
243
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment also operates as a
limitation on state tax exemptions by requiring reasonable classification. However,
the inhibitions implicit in a federal system make for greater judicial restraint in the
application of federal constitutional limitations by federal courts, so that classifications
deemed unreasonable by many state courts might be sustained at the federal level.
A comprehensive analysis in 1938 of the application of the equal protection clause
in the area of state tax legislation concluded that the Supreme Court has permitted
state legislatures great discretion in classifying for tax purposes. Sholley, Equal
Protection in Tax Legislation (pts. 1-2), 24 VA. L. Ray. 229, 388, 414-16 (1938).
A 1959 study substantially confirms this conclusion. Naw~ousE, op. cit. Mrpra note
238, at 601-08. It would seem highly unlikely, therefore, that the Supreme Court
would characterize as wholly arbitrary the exemption of a publicly owned industrial
facility either as public property or as public property used for public purposesregardless of the lack of public control reserved over the facility.
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Statutory tax exemption of general obligation bonds, however, can
be justified without imposing additional requirements. These bonds
pledge the credit of the municipality. Since they flow freely in commerce, there may well be no easy means of ascertaining the purpose for
which the proceeds were expended. It is true that the economic benefits of the exemption flow directly to the lessee in the form of reduced
rent, but the exemption is several steps removed from the lessee as it
is an exemption on the property and income of third parties, the bondholders. In considering the problem of exemption of the facility however, the very object of the tax levy is a structure in which the lessee
has an interest approximating full ownership.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Public industrial financing is a logical culmination of the city and
state planning movement which began in the early years of this century.
Public planning guided private development, but it rarely actively
stimulated it. By the end of World War II, the emphasis had shifted
from planning to planning joined with development.24 4 Negative attitudes toward expanding government were overcome by a resurgence of
the American drive for growth and progress. The primary economic
energy for this drive has come from the industrially underdeveloped
southern and border states which are in the midst of their regional
take-off. Significant secondary support has come from the mature
economies of the Middle Atlantic and New England states that have
decided to come to grips with the many adverse long run regional
trends.
The increasing recognition that the states and municipalities must
assume a more affirmative role in promoting local and regional development is also reflected in the current programs of public subsidization of
commuter rail transportation in metropolitan areas.24 5
The growing acceptance of the necessity for public industrial
financing has stimulated a state constitutional counter-revolution directed at sharply modifying the public aid limitations and the public
purpose doctrine, our legacies from the nineteenth-century constitutional revolution. The current movement has taken two forms--outright modification by constitutional amendment and erosive modification by combined legislative and judicial action. Public industrial
financing programs based upon an enabling constitutional amendment
See GiLmoaE, op. clt. supra note 225, at 13-14, 28-31.
245 See, e.g., Opinion of the justices, 337 Mass. 800, 152 N.E.2d 90 (1958);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:12A-1 to -16 (Supp. 1961); 1958 Ops. PHnAmrPHEA CITY
SoLIcirR 42.
244
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present no substantial question of state constitutional law. This study
has accordingly focused upon the constitutional problems arising under
programs which rest solely upon statute.
The principal conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1. The Tax Supported Plans. Approval of these plans requires
a significant departure from settled judicial construction of both the
public aid limitations and the public purpose test over a period of many
decades. In passing upon programs involving public investment in
transportation, recreation and parking facilities, leased for long terms
to private parties, courts have placed major emphasis on the degree
of public control asserted--control to insure realization of the public
purposes underlying the program and control in the interest of safeguarding the public investment. However, where the urgency of
achieving the economic objectives so dictated, courts have relaxed the
weight accorded the public control factor. This relaxation has been
particularly apparent in the case of public investment in port facilities
which are leased to private carriers. Judicial approval of tax supported
public industrial financing requires an even further dilution of the
public control requirement.
The need for careful differentiation between the public aid limitations and the public purpose test has been emphasized. The former
come to us with a specificity rooted in the nineteenth-century reaction
to the evils of the railroad bond era. To permit a further relaxation
of the public control requirement would do violence to the language of
the public aid limitations and to their spirit. Tax supported plans
should, therefore, be deemed invalid in states where a pertinent public
aid limitation has been adopted.
The public purpose doctrine, however, is basically a due process
limitation and is capable of greater elasticity. It is urged herein that
the public purpose test evolve in the direction of greater judicial restraint. Two alternative standards are recommended: the rational
basis standard, which would permit judicial approval of the tax supported plans in their present form; and the modified enterprise aid
standard, which would permit approval of these plans after the adoption of feasible legislative changes.
The public aid limitations are becoming obsolete in twentiethcentury America. Outright repeal rather than ad hoc modification is
probably the healthiest remedy. If some judicially enforceable constitutional limitation on the purpose of public expenditures is deemed necessary, this can best be accomplished by the use of the public purpose
doctrine, a limitation which can be made responsive to the forces of
change in a dynamic society.
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2. The Revenue Bond Plan. While projects under this plan are
not tax supported, municipal activity under these statutes could lead
to tort liability or impaired credit status. These risks, however, must
be regarded as minimal. Due deference to the legislative judgment
dictates a strict application of both the public aid limitations and the
public purpose test so as to permit economic experimentation.
3. Tax Exemption. Whether a tax exempt status for the
facilities and the bonds can be upheld should be considered as questions
independent from that of the validity of the financing. Tax exemption
of the facility must be regarded realistically as a subsidy-a gratuitous
rendering of municipal services to selected manufacturers. In deciding
whether this classification scheme can be justified under the uniformity
clause of state constitutions, courts may appropriately require a higher
degree of public control over the tax exempt facility than is here
recommended under the public purpose test.
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APPENDIX
THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC INDUSTRIAL FINANCING 1

State

Total
Public Funds
Invested
(Dollars)

Number of
Projects

Total
Project Cost
(Dollars) 2

Date of
Enactment of
Statute or
Constitutional
Amendment

1. MissIssIPPI PLAN
Alabama3
Arkansas
Louisiana 4
Mississippi 5
Tennessee
6

3,210,000

9
34
16
320
44

9,931,250

3,430,000
110,343,000

13,492,000
2.

1950
1958
1952
1936
1955

REVENUE BOND PLAN

Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Kentucky
Mississippi
New Mexico
North Dakota 7
Tennessee

24
25
no inforrr ation
29
2
4
2
105

Arkansas 8
Kansas 9
Kentucky
0
Pennsylvania 1

7
no infFormation

39,935,000

32,483,000
approx. 4 to 5 million

30,570,000
370,000
9,113,000
3,500,000
49,733,000

1949, 1951
1960
1957
1946
1960
1955
1955
1951

3. PENNSYLVANIA PLAN

4.
16
15

Maryland
New Hampshire
Oklahoma

1
11
3

no information
no information

3,074,390
61,438,094

1955, 1960
1923
1958
1956

5,993,000
14,000,000

1958
1958

no information
3,202,000
2,557,160

1960
1955
1960

517,000
19,507,174

3
157

Maine
Rhode Island

601,000
124,005

NEW ENGLAND PLAN

5,103,431
12,547,000
5. 01LAHOMA PLAN

17,500
3,202,000
569,989

'Unless otherwise indicated, all information is based upon letters and reports
of the appropriate state agencies.
2 In the case of the Mississippi and revenue bond plans, unless otherwise stated,
the cost of the project equals the total funds raised by the municipalities.
3 Complete information on Alabama is not available. In addition to the projects
listed above under the Mississippi and revenue bond plans, the Alabama Planning
and Industrial Development Board lists twenty-six other projects in the amount of
$5,214,000; the agency is uncertain as to whether these have been financed by general
obligation or revenue bonds. However, since municipalities in only five counties
have been authorized to issue general obligation bonds for industrial financing, it is
likely that the bulk of these projects were financed by revenue bonds.
4 INVESTMENT BANKERS Ass'N OF AMERICA, MUNICIPAL INDUSTRIAL FINANCING

(1961). 1961 projects are not included.
5 For the ten-year period, 1952 through 1961, the statistics for Mississippi are
as follows: 242 projects; project cost of $93,707,000.
6 See note 3 supra.
7While the cost of the project generally equals the amount of revenue bonds
issued, this is not true in North Dakota, where the industrial firm had advanced
a portion of the capital. The total amount of revenue bonds issued is $2,555,000.
8 This includes current state funds used to finance four purchases of issues of
second lien obligations of non-profit development corporations in the amount of
$151,000 pursuant to ARE. STAT. ANN. § 9-532 (Supp. 1961), and three purchases
of issues of municipal revenue bonds under the authority of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1207
(Supp. 1961).
9 HITE, THE INDUSTRIAL LEVY IN KANSAS 11, 30 (Kansas Univ. Bureau of Business Research 1954). The statistics are for the period 1939-1953.
10 This includes $165,000 of authority loans (four projects) which have been
retired.
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TABLE I

State
Ala.
Ark.
Kan.
Ky.
Md.
Miss.
N.M.
Tenn.

Del.
Fla.
Idaho
Neb.
Wash.

Case
Legislation upheld
Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala.
49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952).
Andres v. First Arkansas Dev. Fin.
Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97
(1959).
Kansas ex rel. Ferguson v. City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 (1961).
Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d
648 (Ky. 1956).
City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9,
136 A.2d 852 (1957).
Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss.
75, 178 So. 799 (1938).
Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62
N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956).
McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn.
498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958).
Legislation held invalid
McClelland v. Mayor of Wilmington, 159
A.2d 596 (Del. Ch. 1960).
State v. Town of No. Miami, 59 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1952).
Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg.
Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.24 767 (1960).
State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164
Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d
799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).

Number of
months in
24 month period
prior to decision
Percapita
in which
income as
unemployment
percentage rateis higher
of continental than national
U.S.1
average'

62

20

61

24

92

2

68

24

106

0

36
77

0

70

24

136

2

80

9

82

9

90

3

105

17

'The figures on per capita income as a percentage of the continental United
States are generally for the year of the state court decision. However, in the case
of Delaware, Idaho, and Kansas, the statistics for the year 1959 are used because
later years are unavailable. Where more than one industrial financing decision has
been before any court, the case which appears to be the most crucial has been selected
for this table. Unless otherwise indicated, all the information on per capita income is
from the United States Statistical Abstract, as follows:
Ala.
1954, at 306.
Miss. Survey of CurArk. 1961, at 310.
rent Business, AuDel.
1961, at 310.
gust, 1949, at 15.
Fla.
1954, at 306.
Neb. 1959, at 314.
Idaho 1961, at 310.
N.M. 1958, at 314.
Kan. 1961, at 310.
Tenn. 1960, at 313.
Ky.
1958, at 314.
Wash. 1961, at 310.
Md.
1959, at 314.
bThis column sets forth the number of months in the 24 month period immediately
preceding the state court decision in which the ratio of state insured unemployment
to average covered employment is higher than the similar ratio for the entire continental United States. All information is from the pertinent monthly issues of U.S.
Dep't of Labor, The Market and Employment Security.
There are no reliable statistics available. In view of general information about
the critical state of the Mississippi economy during this period, however, it is reasonable to infer that the rate of unemployment was higher than the national average.
See generally WALLAcE, INDUSTRIALIZING MISSISSIPPI 2-3, 13-17 (Univ. of Miss.

Bureau of Public Administration 1952).

